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IN LUCE TUA 
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor 
Potpourri II 
Last month's "Potpourri" version of In Luce Tua elic-
ited a number of favorable responses, not so much for 
its content (indeed, it provoked more than the usual 
quota of comments calling into question the editor's 
knowledge, wisdom, or store of Christian virtue) as for 
its form. Those who liked the format fell mainly into 
two categories: 1) people whose time is limited (or at-
tention span short) and who therefore prefer brief 
comments to extended argument; and 2) people who 
depend on In Luce Tua to keep their choler count high 
and their politics properly focused and who found our 
attention to several issues at once a better counter-
guide to public life than the normal single-issue for-
mat provides. Given that widespread if dubious en-
couragement, we offer this month a similar sampler. 
• There are recent signs, inconclusive but perhaps 
indicative, that the domestic debate over Nicaragua is 
becoming less polarized than has until now been the 
case. The gap between the contesting groups remains 
wide, but both sides appear to have moved some dis-
tance closer to reality in assessing the situation there. 
An honest policy disagreement, no matter how heated, 
marks a considerable advance over a moralizing ex-
change of conflicting political fantasies. 
Those critical of the Reagan Administration's 
policies have tended in the past to a largely uncritical 
view of the Sandinistas. That is now rapidly fading. 
The New York Times, for example, which has given 
every benefit of doubt possible to the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment, now writes openly of the Sandinistas' "road 
to Stalinism" and concedes that "the pluralist revolu-
tion seems hopelessly betrayed." Many other erstwhile 
Sandinista supporters have stopped obscuring what 
the Sandinistas themselves made no great effort to 
hide: that they were and are Marxist-Leninists, and 
that their way of governing is not simply a variation 
on social democracy. 
The evidence is now overwhelming to all but the 
willfully blind: Nicaragua is a repressive society that 
has no essential regard for civil or religious rights. It 
is regrettable that among the willfully blind one has to 
include a number of church groups. Pro-Sandinista 
enthusiasm exists almost nowhere except in such cir-
cles. Theirs is a sad triumph of hope over experience 
and evidence. 
On the other side of the issue, virtually no one out-
side the Reagan Administration sees the contras as an 
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unambiguous set of "freedom fighters." Those who 
support the anti-Sandinistas know full well that they 
include in their ranks a number of unsavory individu-
als and groups. This is clearly a case where one opts 
for what seems at best only the lesser evil. 
The end of wishful thinking on both sides leads to 
no necessary consensus. One can be unillusioned con-
cerning the Sandinistas and still oppose American aid 
to the contras. Therein lies a legitimate policy dispute. 
What is no longer possible is the fantasy, on either 
side, that what is involved in Nicaragua is a conflict be-
tween the forces of darkness and the forces of light. 
• If there is some progress beyond moralizing in 
the debate over Nicaragua, the same cannot be said 
concerning South Africa. The case for sanctions there 
has been won, that for disinvestment is in full cry, and 
those of us who maintain reservations about either 
find ourselves hopelessly on the moral defensive. 
It is no longer sufficient to declare oneself unam-
biguously opposed to apartheid. Credentials in the 
form of policy prescriptions are now required. Indeed, 
one regularly encounters the argument that those 
skeptical of sanctions and disinvestment are suspect in 
their anti-apartheid declarations: you can only show 
yourself to be anti-apartheid enough, the argument 
goes, by joining the call for strong economic restric-
tions. It is frequently implied that behind the Reagan 
Administration's opposition to sanctions lurks an insuf-
ficient moral outrage over the South African govern-
ment's racist policies. 
The argument for sanctions is not inconsiderable. 
Even if such a policy should prove ineffectual, it is 
plausibly suggested, it is still required as an expression 
of our thorough-going disapproval. The point is not 
so much to make a difference as to express an at-
titude. Fair enough, but perhaps other considerations 
might be allowed to intrude. 
There is perhaps no white person in all South Af-
rica who has established a more justified reputation 
for moral decency than the novelist Alan Paton, au-
thor of such eloquent fictional renderings of the case 
for racial justice as Cry, the Beloved Country and Too Late 
the Phalarope. Paton, whom no one can plausibly accuse 
of racial indifference or insensitivity, has recently is-
sued a powerful attack on disinvestment. (The article, 
originally published in South Africa, has been re-
printed in the October issue of Crisis.) Paton argues, in 
sum, that disinvestment will not lead the South Afri-
can government to change its policies, that it will do 
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serious economic damage to poor black South Afri-
cans, and that if it does lead to such unrest as to insti-
gate revolution blacks will only suffer. 
The point is not that Paton is necessarily right. 
Many liberal South Africans, black and white, are sure 
he is not. The point is rather that moral anguish leads 
in no necessary policy direction in South Africa, and 
that people of impeccable moral credentials can doubt 
the wisdom of sanctions and disinvestment. Moral ges-
tures and intentions do not, all by themselves, consti-
tute a moral policy. 
• The farther we get in time from the Iceland sum-
mit, the less clear it becomes what actually transpired 
there or what its implications for the future of Soviet-
American relations might be. The spirit of Reykjavik 
appears to have been one of utter confusion. 
We know that no agreement was reached, but we 
don't know if one was genuinely possible or, if it was, 
what its precise nature might have been. Some far-
reaching proposals got placed on the table by both 
sides, but the degree of seriousness or good faith be-
hind those proposals cannot easily be measured. 
The confusion over the meeting results in no small 
part from uncertainty over what it was that President 
Reagan had in mind in terms of long-range goals. The 
Russians contend-and some of the President's early 
comments pointed in that direction-that the U.S. pro-
posed the total elimination of strategic nuclear 
weapons within a decade. The President now insists, 
however, that he intended only the destruction by 
both sides of their ballistic missiles. 
The distinction is no quibble: it is the difference be-
tween maintaining the nuclear deterrent-though at a 
greatly reduced level-and doing away with it entirely. 
If the latter was intended, the implications are truly 
revolutionary. The entire basis of Western defense 
strategy would be overturned at once, and the Rus-
sians, given their considerable superiority in conven-
tional weapons and in personnel, would be handed an 
enormous short-run advantage. Perhaps more impor-
tant, we would face a situation where war between 
East and West-now, thanks to the nuclear specter, 
entirely unthinkable-would no longer be c~nceivable 
only to lunatics. 
It is difficult to believe that the President meant 
what the Soviets-and others-insist that he said. The 
confusion in his mind and ours as to where we ought 
to be headed in nuclear policy needs immediate clarifi-
cation. Our European allies are thoroughly alarmed 
and our own defense establishment quite bemused. 
This is one situation where the President's customary 
genial vagueness about facts simply will not do. 
That point of confusion aside, it remains unclear 
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what level of arms control short of full nuclear disarm-
ament might be achieveable. General Secretary Gor-
bachev made bold proposals for reduction of strategic 
weapons in Europe and indicated flexibility on other 
matters relating to mutual inspection and gradual re-
duction of nuclear testing, but everything, he insisted, 
depends on American willingness to restrict testing of 
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) entirely to 
the laboratory. Reagan, as he has made clear from the 
beginning, will not so restrain himself on SDI, and 
thus we stand, as of now, at a stalemate. 
Skeptics suggest that Reagan got himself mouse-
trapped at Reykjavik, that the Soviets knew their pro-
posals on SDI were unacceptable and so made gener-
ous offers elsewhere in the comfortable knowledge 
that the President would reject them and consequently 
suffer the political embarrassment of appearing obdu-
rate. Whatever one thinks of the Russians' sincerity, it 
seems clear that SDI is the central issue in the arms 
control debate. Its critics think it technically infeasible 
and financially prohibitive; beyond that, they say, its 
development is incompatible with any hope for arms 
reduction. Most of them concede that it may have 
served a purpose as a bargaining chip in getting the 
Russians to the negotiating table, but they contend 
that the bargaining chip should now be cashed in for 
an arms control agreement. 
We remain agnostic on the question. An arms con-
trol agreement would certainly be desirable, and SDI 
may indeed be either unworkable or exorbitantly ex-
pensive. But if it is workable-and we don't think that 
point has been clearly established one way or the 
other-it would be even more desirable than reduc-
tions in nuclear arms. A substantial defense against 
nuclear attack (and it would not have to be entirely in-
vulnerable to serve its purposes) would offer a far 
more attractive and stable deterrent to nuclear war 
than the balance-of-terror currently provides. Critics 
call SDI a Maginot Line in space; they may be right, 
but they have not conclusively made their case. 
In the meantime, we need not suppose that SDI is 
necessarily an ali-or-nothing proposition. The Russians 
sometimes seem intransigent on the point, but they 
have occasionally dropped hints that there is room for 
compromise. That, we think, is the direction in which 
American diplomacy should now head. The Soviet 
Union may be willing to strike an arms bargain in ex-
change for some stretching-out of our SDI field test-
ing schedule short of deployment. We suspect that the 
bargaining game has not yet fully been played out. ·In 
any case, if America does decide to drop SDI, it 
should be on the merits of the program, not as a re-
sponse to Soviet insistence that negotiation of nuclear 
policy can only be conducted on their terms. Cl 
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r Stanley Hauerwas 
A CHRISTIAN CRITIQUE 
OF CHRISTIAN AMERICA 
Why Both the Mainstream and the Right are Wrong 
At a conference on narrative and virtue I had an 
encounter with a philosopher that raises the problem 
with which I wish to deal. My philosophical counter-
part is a Piercian who is also a commited Jew. In his 
paper he had argued that most of the rational 
paradigms accepted by contemporary philosophy can-
not make sense of Judaism. We began by exchanging 
views about why current ethical theory seems so com-
mitted to foundationalist epistemological assumptions. 
We shared in general a sympathy with anti-found-
ationalist arguments though neither of us wanted to 
give up any possibility of some more modest realist 
epistemology. We also found we were equally critical 
of liberal political theory and in particular the ahistor-
ical character of its methodology. Then our conversa-
tion suddenly took a turn for which I was completely 
unprepared. It went something like this: 
Philosopher: Do you support prayer in the pub-
lic schools? 
T heologian: No, I do not because I do not want 
the state sponsoring my faith. 
Philosopher: That is not the real reason. You 
are just afraid to be for anything 
that Jerry Falwell is for. You really 
are a liberal in spite of your doubts 
Stanley Hauerwas is Professor of Theological Ethics at the 
Divinity School of Duke University. His many books include 
Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theolog-
ical Ethics (1975), A Community of Character: Toward 
a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (1982), The 
Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics 
(1983), and Against the Nations: War and Survival in 
a Liberal Society (1985). This essay was originally pre-
sented this fall as the 1986 0. P. Kretzmann Lecture m 
Christian Ethics at Valparaiso University. 
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about liberalism's philosophical 
adequacy. 
Theologian: That is not fair. I did not say I was 
against school prayer because I 
think such prayer is coercive, 
though I think such considerations 
are not unimportant, but because 
state sponsored prayer cannot help 
but give the impression that the 
state is friendly toward religion. 
Moreover prayers, insofar as they 
can pass muster in a religiously 
pluralistic context, are so anemic 
that they cannot help but give a 
distorted view of God. So I am 
against school prayer not because 
it is against the tenets of liberal-
ism but because it is theologically a 
scandal. 
Prayers in the public schools, 
insofar as they can pass muster in a 
religiously pluralistic context, are 
so anemic that they cannot help but 
give a distorted view of God. They 
should be opposed, therefore, on 
grounds of theological inadequacy. 
Philosopher: T hat is not good enough. As a 
Christian you typically do not give 
a damn about the Jews. You want 
to create a civilization and society 
and then walk away from it when 
the going gets a little tough. Of 
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course the prayers sponsored by 
public authorities are degraded but 
they still remind people that they 
are creatures. A vague god prayed 
to vaguely is better than no god or 
prayer at all. Otherwise we face the 
possibility of a neo-pagan culture 
for which liberal procedural rules 
of fair play will be no match. 
Pagan societies kill Jews with an 
abandon that Christians can never 
muster. Christianity, even in a 
degraded form, at least has material 
convictions that can make the 
persecution and killing of Jews 
problematic. Not so with paganism. 
Theologian: I am a bit surprised to hear you 
argue this way. After all, Christians 
have persecuted and killed Jews 
with as much enthusiasm as any-
one. I would think you would feel 
safer in a secular culture than one 
that is quasi-Christian. Indeed has 
that not been the dominant social 
strategy of Jews since the En-
lightenment? The way to secure 
protection from the Christians is to 
create and support liberal societies 
where religion is relegated to the 
private sphere and thus becomes 
unavailable for public policy di-
rected against the Jews or those of 
any other religious faith. 
Philosopher: I do not deny that is the strategy of 
many Jews, but I think this century 
has shown it to be a decisive fail-
ure. Pagan societies kill us with an 
abandon that Christians can never 
muster. Christianity even in a de-
graded form at least has material 
convictions that can make the per-
secution and killing of Jews prob-
lematic. Paganism has no such con-
victions so I will take my chances 
with the Christians and their 
societies. After all, we Jews do not 
ask for much. We just do not want 
you to kill our children. Living in 
quasi-Christian sooeues means we 
have to put up with a lot of incon-
venience and prejudice-i.e., 
Christmas as a school holiday- but 
we Jews have long known how to 
handle that. We flourish under a 
little prejudice. What we cannot 
stand is the false tolerance of 
liberalism that relegates us to the 
arena of being just one religion 
among others. 
Theologian: So if I understand you rightly, you 
are suggesting that you want me as 
a Christian to support school 
prayer, even if such prayers are but 
forms of degraded Christian re-
ligiosity, because at least that con-
tinues to underwrite the assump-
tion we are a "religious" society. 
Such an assumption allows an ap-
peal to a higher standard of justice 
that makes the survival of the 
Jewish people more likely. 
Philosopher: That is about right. You Christians 
have to take responsibility for what 
you have done. You created a civili-
zation based on belief in God and 
it is your responsibility to continue 
to suppport that civilization. 
Theologian: But you know yourself that such a 
social strategy cannot help but lead 
to the continued degradation of 
Christianity. The more Christians 
try to make Christianity a 
philosophy sufficient to sustain a 
society, especially a liberal society, 
the more we must distort or ex-
plain away our fundamental beliefs. 
Therefore in the name of sustain-
ing a civilization Christians increas-
ingly undercut the ability of the 
church to' take a critical stance to-
ward this society. Even when the 
church acts as a critic in such a 
context, it cannot be more than a 
friendly critic since it has a stake in 
maintaining the basic structure of 
society. 
Philosopher: Why should that bother me? Chris-
tians have always been willing to 
degrade their convictions in the 
past to attain social and political 
power (of course, always in order 




should they start worrying about 
being degraded now? On that score 
it seems a little late. For the church 
to start to worry about being pure 
is about as realistic as Madonna 
worrying about being a virgin. It is 
just too late. So if you care any-
thing about the Jews you ought to 
support school prayer. 
Our conversation did not end at this point but it is 
enough for my purposes. Even though I think most of 
what my philosopher friend has to say is right, for 
theological reasons I still cannot support school 
prayer. That I cannot puts me at odds with the social 
strategy of most Christians, both liberal and conserva-
tive, in America. In the next section I will try to ex-
plain why this is the case. Then the ground will be 
prepared for me to suggest what a more radical Chris-
tian critique of America entails both in terms of its 
logic as well as a political strategy. 
II 
Since the turn of the century, one of the dominant 
themes in Christian social ethics has been the Chris-
tian's responsibility for societal affairs. Time and time 
again it is argued that faith and action cannot be sepa-
rated. Our religious convictions cannot be relegated to 
one sphere of our lives and our social and political ac-
tivities to another. Since the faith of Christians is a 
faith that does justice there is no way we can avoid 
political activity. Whether the political realm is viewed 
Lutheran-like as a realm of lesser evil or more Calvin-
istically as the arena of the mediocre good, Christians 
cannot avoid involvement in the political process. That 
is especially the case in a democratic society in which 
the actions of individual citizens can make a differ-
ence. 
Armed with this set of presuppositions Christians in 
the "mainstream" denominations attacked those Chris-
tians who maintained no particular social or political 
responsibilities. This position, they argued, pietistically 
relegates salvation to the individual's relation to God 
and thus betrays the essential Christian claim that God 
is Lord of all creation. What must be remembered is 
that Jesus came preaching a Kingdom that makes it 
impossible for his followers to be indifferent to the in-
justices in their surrounding social orders. On these 
grounds mainstream churches, such as those that con-
stitute the National Council of Churches, urged Bap-
tist and other pietistic Christians to join them in the 
political struggle to make this a more just society. As 
is often pointed out, not to take a political stand in the 
name of being Christian in fact is to take a political 
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stand. 
Pietists, in defense of their position, sometimes re-
sponded by appealing not to their theological convic-
tions but instead to what they considered the norma-
tive commitments of the American society-namely 
that our Constitution has erected a "wall of separation 
between church and state." In the name of maintain-
ing the freedom of religion the church claims no com-
petency in matters political. The difficulty with this 
position, however, is that it attributes a perspective to 
the Constitution that simply is not there. Neither the 
free exercise clause nor the non-establishment clause 
prohibits Christians, either as organized in churches or 
as individuals, from seeking to influence their society 
or government. Just to the extent that the free church 
tradition allows itself to be so excluded from the pub-
lic arena, moreover, it underwrites an individualistic 
account of Christianity that is antithetical to its very 
nature. 
Christians in the mainstream 
denominations attacked those 
Christians who maintained no 
particular social or political 
responsibilities. This position, they 
argued, pietistically relegated faith 
to the individual's relation to God. 
Such was the state of the debate among Christians 
until recently. But now suddenly everything has 
changed because the message finally got across to the 
pietistic Baptists. They have become politically active 
seeking to influence our society and government to 
support causes in the name of making this a better so-
ciety. Jerry Falwell represents the triumph of 
mainstream Christianity in America as he is convinced, 
just like Martin Luther King, that Christians cannot 
abandon the political realm in their desire for justice. 
They must seek through the constitutionally guaran-
teed means to influence our political representatives to 
prevent abortion, to support democratic regimes 
around the world, to support Israel, to provide sup-
port for the family, and so on. 
T herefore the mainstream won, but it is not a vic-
tory they are celebrating. For it turns out that once 
politically inactive Christians became active the causes 
they supported were not those the mainstream wanted 
supported. The temptation is to try to defeat this new 
political activism by using the slogans of the past-reli-
gion and politics do not mix or you should not try to 
7 
force your religious views on anyone through public 
policy-but to do so is to go against the position the 
mainstream has been arguing for years. 
In order to understand how we have reached this 
point in American Protestantism, I need to call your 
attention to some aspects of the history of Christianity 
in America. I do not mean I am going to give you a 
rendition of Puritan America or engage in the debate 
about how "Christian" America has been. 1 While such 
studies and questions are interesting and may still have 
some normative importance, they are not crucial for 
helping us understand why Falwell presents such a 
challenge to mainstream Christianity. To understand 
that we need to appreciate why Christian thinkers 
about ethics in America, especially since the nineteenth 
century, have assumed that Christianity and democ-
racy are integrally related. 
That they have done so is because America stands 
as the great experiment in what Max Stackhouse has 
identified as "constructive Protestantism." Stackhouse 
notes that in Social Teaching of the Christian Churches 
Ernst Troeltsch argues that only two major Christian 
social philosophies have ever been developed-the 
Catholic and the Calvinist. Yet each of these as social 
philosophies no longer seems viable. "The vision of an 
organic, hierarchical order sanctified by objectified 
means of grace, and that of an established theocracy 
of elect saints who are justified by grace through faith, 
must both be judged as no longer live options for so-
cial reconstruction. This is not to suggest that these 
visions do not still hold power. . . . But this is to 
suggest that these two forms of 'Christendom' have 
ended--or rather, have played their part and now 
must yield the stage after their immeasurable contribu-
tion to the drama of Christianity in modern culture."2 
According to Stackhouse, the crucial question is 
1For an extremely interesting approach to this latter ques-
tion see Mark Noll, Nathan Hatch, and George Marsden, 
The Search for Christian America (Westchester, Illinois: 
Crossway Books, 1983). In summary, their position is that 
"a careful study of the facts of history shows that early 
America does not deserve to be considered uniquely, dis-
tinctively or even predominantly Christian, if we mean by 
the word 'Christian' a state of society reflecting the ideals 
presented in Scripture. There is no lost golden age to 
which American Christians may return. In addition, a 
careful study of history will also show that evangelicals 
themselves were often partly to blame for the spread of 
secularism in contemporary American life. We feel also 
that careful examination of Christian teaching on gov-
ernment, the state, and the nature of culture shows that 
the idea of a 'Christian nation' is a very ambiguous con-
cept which is usually harmful to effective Christian action 
in society." p. 17. 
2Max Stackhouse, "Introduction" to Walter Rauschen-
busch's The Righteousness of the Kingdom (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1969), p. 21 . 
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whether Christianity can develop another "social 
philosophy." If it cannot it would then seem the social 
ethical power of Christianity is at an end. Stackhouse 
argues that American Christianity has in fact de-
veloped a third option, which he calls "conciliar de-
nominationalism. "3 
The character of this new form of social philosophy 
Stackhouse sees prefigured in Walter Rauschenbusch, 
who held together two conflicting motifs, sectarianism 
and Christendom, that constitute the unique blend of 
"conciliar denominationalism." "On the one hand, 
Rauschenbusch came from an evangelical background 
from which he gained a sense of intense and explicit 
faith that could only be held by fully committed mem-
bers. On the other hand, Rauschenbusch lived in the 
age of lingering hope for a catholic 'Christian culture' 
and in an age that, especially through the developing 
social sciences, saw the legitimacy of secular realms. 
He, like the developing 'conciliar denominations,' saw 
the necessity of the select body of believers anticipat-
ing the Kingdom in word and deed in good sectarian 
fashion, and of taking the world seriously on its own 
terms, as did all visions of Christendom. These motifs 
conspire in his thought to produce a vision of a rev-
olutionized responsible society for which a socially un-
derstood gospel is the catalyst."4 
Rauschenbusch as the champion of liberal Christian-
ity could speak straightforwardly of the need to "chris-
tianize" social orders. "It is not enough to christianize 
individuals; we must christianize societies, organiza-
tions, nations, for they too have a life of their own 
which may be made better or worse."5 
On that basis he thought it quite possible to speak 
of saved and unsaved organizations. "The one is 
under the law of Christ, the other under the law of 
mammon. The one is democratic and the other auto-
cratic. Whenever capitalism has invaded a new country 
or industry, there has been a speeding up in labor and 
in the production of wealth, but always with a trail of 
human misery, discontent, bitterness, and demoraliza-
tion. When cooperation has invaded a country there 
has been increased thrift, education, and neighborly 
feeling, and there has been no trail of concomitant evil 
and no cries of protest. "6 
The difference between saved and unsaved social 
orders from Rauschenbusch's perspective is quite sim-
ple-saved social orders and institutions are democra-
tic. As he says, "social sciences confirm the correctness 
of Christ's protest against the stratification of society in 
3Stackhouse, p. 22. 
4Stackhouse, pp. 22-23. 
5Rauschenbusch, Righteousness of the Kingdom, p. 102. 
6Walter Rauschenbusch, Theology for the Social Gospel 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1917), pp. 112-113. 
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ranks and classes. What is the general tendency toward 
democracy and the gradual abolition of hereditary 
privileges but history's assent to the revolutionary dog-
mas of Christ?"7 The Kingdom of God is not a con-
cept or ideal for Rauschenbusch; it is a historical force 
at work in humanity. The way it ultimately works its 
way out, moreover, is in the form of democracy. As he 
puts it, "Where religion and intellect combine, the 
foundation is laid for political dernocracy."8 
If, as Stackhouse suggests, America is the great ex-
periment in "constructive Protestantism," it seems what 
is Christian about that construction is dernocracy.9 For 
Rauschenbusch is hardly an isolated figure in claiming 
a close interrelation between Christianity and democ-
racy. As Jan Dawson has recently argued, at the turn 
of this century there developed a "faith in the spiritual 
oneness of Christianity and democracy, based on the 
democratic theology of Christianity and concerned 
primarily with the survival of Christianity in troubled 
modern dernocracies." 10 To support democracy be-
carne a means of supporting Christianity and vice 
versa. 
Dawson quotes Lyman Abbott, successor to Henry 
Ward Beecher, in the liberal Christian paper Outlook to 
the effect that "Democracy is not merely a political 
theory, it is not merely a social opinion; it is a pro-
found religious faith .... To him who holds it, this 
7Rauschenbusch, Righteousness of the Kingdom, p. 199. 
8Rauschenbusch, Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 165. 
9For Stackhouse's own constructive efforts to extend Rau-
schenbusch's program, only now in terms of human 
rights, see his Creeds, Society, and Human Rights (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984). In defense of his position Stack-
house provides a history of the joining of Puritanism and 
Liberalism to create the universalistic creed of rights that 
culminated in the United Declaration on Human Rights. 
He notes that these "principles could not be articulated 
in the particular language of Christian piety which had 
shaped both the Christian and secular liberal 
philosophers who had first developed them. Representa-
tives from many cultures and religions would have re-
sisted overt theological formulations in christological or 
deist terms. The principles had to be stated in 'confession-
ally neutral' terms. But even at this point we see the 
triumph of the basic assumptions of the Liberal-Puritan 
synthesis. The state itself should not be 'religious.' In this 
view the theologically and morally valid state is one lim-
ited by righteous principles and one that allows other or-
ganizations to define what is religiously valid. In brief, 
the 'godly state' is a secular state.'' p. 193. Stackhouse's 
account seems far too sanguine about how the obvious 
tensions between the Puritan sense of community can be 
reconciled with the individualism of liberalism. But even 
if that were not a problem one cannot help but wonder 
what has happened that a "secular state" by definition 
can be called "godly." 
10Jan Dawson, "The Religion of Democracy in Early Twen-
tieth-Century America," journal of Church and State, 27, I 
(Winter, 1985), p. 47. 
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one fundamental faith in the Fatherhood of God and 
in the universal brotherhood of man is the essence of 
democracy." 11 If democracy was seen as the in-
stitutionalized form of Christianity it was no less true 
that democracy was dependent on religion to survive. 
Thus in 1907, the year following the article by Abbott, 
Robert Ashworth wrote in the Chicago Divinity School 
Journal that "the fate of the democratic movement 
rests ultimately upon religion. Religion is essential to 
democracy, and is, indeed, its foundation. It is based 
upon the New Testament principle of the equal value 
of every soul in the sight of the Divine Father." 12 
This kind of direct theological appeal in support of 
democracy becomes more muted as Christian thinkers 
become increasingly aware of the religious and social 
pluralism of America, but that does not lessen their 
enthusiasm for democracy as that form of society and 
government that best institutionalizes Christian social 
philosophy. Reinhold Niebuhr is certainly a case in 
point. Vicious in his critique of the theological and so-
cial optimism of the "social gospelers" defense of de-
mocracy, he never questioned the assumption that de-
mocracy was the most appropriate form of society and 
government for Christians. What was needed, accord-
ing to Niebuhr, was to provide a more adequate basis 
for democracy in a realistic account of human nature. 
Such an account, he thought, was to be found primar-
ily in the "Christian view of human nature (that) is 
more adequate for the development of a democratic 
society than either the optimism with which democracy 
has become historically associated or the moral cyni-
cism which inclines human communities to tyrannical 
political strategies." 13 
In effect, from Rauschenbusch to the present, Chris-
tian social ethics has had one agenda-to show why 
American democracy possesses distinctive religious 
status. The primary subject of Christian ethics in 
America has been Arnerica. 14 This has now even be-
come the project for Roman Catholic social ethics as 
exemplified in the work of John Courtney Murray. It 
was Murray's task at once to make America amenable 
11Quoted in Dawson, p. 48. 
12/bid., p. 48. 
13Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children 
of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 
xiii. In fairness to Niebuhr, it should be pointed out that 
he wrote The Children of Light at the end of WWII in the 
interest of trying to deflate some of the more enthusiastic 
celebrations of democracy the war had occasioned. Yet 
Niebuhr remained throughout his life a firm supporter 
of democracy as that social system which best embodies 
the Christian understanding of man. 
14For a more complete development of this claim see my 
Against the Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society 
(Minneapolis: Winston-Seabury Press, 1985), pp. 23-50. 
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to Catholic social theory by interpreting the separation 
of church and state as a confession by the state of its 
incompetence in matters of religion 15 and to make 
Catholics amenable to America by showing that Cath-
olics can enthusiastically support democracy as an 
imaginative solution to the problem of religious 
pluralism. 16 Murray argued even a stronger case by 
suggesting that American democracy, whose political 
substance consists in an order of antecedent rights to 
the state, 17 can only be sustained by the kind of natu-
ral law theory carried by Catholicism in contrast to the 
individualism of Locke and Hobbes.18 
In The Naked Public Square, Richard 
John Neuhaus argues that among the 
American people religion and morality 
are conjoined. Religion in our 
popular life is the morality-bearing 
part of culture, and in that sense 
it is the heart of culture. 
It is only against this background that one can un-
derstand and/or appreciate the work of Richard John 
Neuhaus. In his much publicized book, The Naked Pub-
lic Square: Religion and Democracy in America, Neuhaus 
argues that we are facing a crisis in our society. Be-
cause religious discourse has increasingly been 
excluded from our public life, he fears that a moral 
vacuum has been created. This vacuum threatens con-
stantly to be ftlled by totalitarianism, as the isolation of 
the individual from mediating structures gives us little 
power to stand against the omniverous appetite of the 
bureaucratic state. 19 
The only way out of this predicament is to mend the 
"rupture between public policy and moral sentiment. 
15This part of Murray's work is often unfortunately ig-
nored. One of the reasons for this may be because these 
are articles published in Theological Studies, 13 and 14 
(1953) called "The Church and Totalitarian Democracy," 
and "Leo XIII: Separation of Church and State." They 
are still worth reading. 
16This is, of course, the main argument of Murray's We 
Hold These Truths (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 
1964). 
17Murray, We Hold These Truths, p. 308. 
18In his An American Strategic Theology (New Jersey: Paulist 
Press, 1982), John Coleman provides the best Roman 
Catholic attempt to continue Murray's project. Coleman, 
however, is much more interested in how Catholicism 
can act to renew the ethos or civil religion of America 
than the more strictly constitutional issues with which 
Murray was concerned. 
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But the only moral sentiment of public effect is the 
sentiment that is embodied in and reinforced by living 
tradition. There are no a-religious moral traditions of 
public, or at least of democratic, force in American 
life. This is not to say that morality must be embodied 
in religion nor that the whole of religion is morality. 
It is to say that among the American people, religion 
and morality are conjoined. Religion in our popular 
life is the morality-bearing part of culture, and in that 
sense the heart of culture."20 
From this perspective Neuhaus is appreciative of the 
19Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion 
and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1984), pp. 83-86. Richard Taylor rightly argues that no 
one saw this problem clearer than Hegel-namely that 
"absolute freedom requires homogeneity. It cannot brook 
differences which would prevent everyone participating 
totally in the decisions of the society. And what is even 
more, it requires some near unanimity of will to emerge 
from this deliberation, for otherwise the majority would 
just be imposing its will on the minority and freedom 
would not be universal. But differentiations of some fairly 
essential kinds are ineradicable. Moreover they are recog-
nized in our post-Romantic climate as essential to human 
identity. Men cannot simply identify themselves as men, 
but they define themselves more immediately by their 
partial community, cultural, linguistic, confessional and 
so on. Modern democracy is therefore in a bind. I think 
the dilemma of this kind can be seen in contemporary 
society. Modern societies have moved towards much 
greater homogeneity and greater interdependence, so 
that partial communities lost their autonomy, and to 
some extent, their identity. But great differences remain; 
only because of the ideology of homogeneity these differ-
ential characteristics no longer have meaning and value for 
those who have them. Thus the rural population is taught 
by the mass media to see itself as just lacking in some of 
the advantages of a more advanced life style. Homogeniza-
tion thus increases minority alienation and resentment and 
the first response of liberal society is to try even more of 
the same: programs to eliminate poverty, or assimilate In-
dians, move populations out of declining regions, bring an 
urban way of life to the countryside. But the radical re-
sponse is to convert this sense of alienation into a demand 
for 'absolute freedom.' The idea is to overcome alienation 
by creating a society in which everyone, including the pre-
sent 'out' groups, participates fully in the decisions. But 
both these solutions would simply aggravate the problem, 
which in the homogenization has undermined the com-
munities or characteristics by which people formerly iden-
tified themselves and put nothing in their place. What does 
step into the gap almost everywhere is ethnic or national 
identity. Nationalism has become the most powerful focus 
of identity in modern society. The demand for radical 
freedom can and frequently does join up with nationalism 
and is given a definite impetus and direction from this.'' 
Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), pp. 114-115. Neuhaus' point is profound, but 
I do not see how he provides an adequate response since 
he continues to support the political and economic pre-
sumptions that are the source of the difficulty. 
20Neuhaus, p. 154. 
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Moral Majority (now Liberty Foundation). For in spite 
of the crudeness with which they often put their po-
sition they have at least raised the issue of the public 
value of religion that at one time was the agenda of 
political liberals. Rather than condemning the Moral 
Majority, Neuhaus seeks to help them enter the public 
debate by basing their appeals to principles that are 
accessible to the public. "Publicly assertive religious 
forces will have to learn that the remedy for the naked 
public square is not naked religion in public. They will 
have to develop a mediating language by which ulti-
mate truths can be related to the penultimate and pre-
penultimate questions of political and legal content. In 
our several traditions there are rich conceptual re-
sources for the development of such mediating lan-
guage-whether the concepts be called natural law, 
common grace, general revelation, or the order of ere-
The Time Flowers 
"Six o'clocks," my father called them, smiled, 
And there was a pause that closed 
The afternoon like an assignment. 
What was humorous waited for the sun 
To collapse, the street's children 
To tire into ash and drift off 
Into houses. The light, then, stretched 
Its dream of birthdays to seventy, 
What he was watching approach 
From the east. At dusk, when we 
Followed the outside corn rows 
To the wall of the highway, 
He sorted the night-sky planets 
From stars. The next farm grew houses; 
A fever of headlights trailed 
A truck. While it passed, turning 
To red, to nothing, he dialed 
Two hours back in the explanatory dark. 
Gary Fincke 
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ation. Such a civil engagement of secular and religious 
forces could produce a new public philosophy to sus-
tain this American experiment in liberal democracy. 
The result may not be that we would agree with one 
another. Indeed there may be more disagreement. But 
at least we would know what we are disagreeing about, 
namely, different ac(ounts of the transcendent good 
by which we might order our life together. Contra Jus-
tice Blackmun and legions of others, democracy is not 
served by evading the question of the good. Democ-
racy becomes a political community worthy of moral 
actors only when we engage the question of the 
good."21 
Neuhaus challenges mainline Protestant liberalism to 
live up to its rightful commitment to sustaining de-
mocracy as the socially specific form that Christianity 
should take.22 As he puts it, "the main line of the 
mainline story was confidence and hope regarding the 
Americanizing of Christianity and the Christianizing of 
America."23 Indeed he argues that in spite of their 
fervor for disestablishing Christianity in America most 
21 Richard John Neuhaus, "Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law, 
Rights, and Transcendent Good," paper delivered at 1985 
conference on Religion and Law at Catholic University Law 
School. (Unpublished), pp. 14-15. For a similar claim see 
The Naked Public Square, p. 36. While agreeing with 
Neuhaus that religion needs to help our society discover or 
create a moral discourse for the public sphere, John Cole-
man rightly raises questions about the assumed neutrality 
or objectivity of that discourse. Thus he criticizes Brian 
Hehir for requiring Christians to come to the public arena 
shorn of their particularistic commitments. As Coleman 
says, he does not think it possible to escape "the 'perma-
nent hermeneutical predicament' of particular languages 
and community traditions in a conflict of interpretive 
schemes through the emergence of a common universal 
language. I fear that this proposal could court the risk of 
a continuation of the pernicious intertwining of an ethic of 
deep concern with an ethic of looking out for number one. 
But finally, and most persuasive for me, I simply do not 
know anywhere else to look in American culture besides to 
our religious ethical resources to find the social wisdom 
and ethical orientation we would seem to need if we are 
to face as Americans our new context of increasing inter-
dependence at the national and international level." An 
American Strategic Theology, pp. 197-198. Thus Coleman, 
like many Protestant thinkers, calls us to renew the biblical 
and republican-virtue traditions against contemporary 
liberalism. [This is, of course, the main theme of William 
Sullivan's Reconstructing Public Philosophy (Berkeley: U. of 
California Press, 1982)]. It is a strange social order indeed 
that makes Catholics so committed to making America 
work that they accept the project of constructive Protes-
tantism. For a provocative analysis of the destructive results 
this process has had on orthodoxy see Vigen Guroian, 
"The Americanization of Orthodoxy: Crisis and Chal-
lenge," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 29, 3, pp. 255-
267. 
22Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, p. 121. 
23Ibid., p. 220. 
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liberals remain committed to "Christianizing" the social 
order. Only the synonyms for "Christianize" today "in-
clude terms such as justice, equality, and sustainabil-
ity."24 
That such is the case helps explain the enthusiasm 
for the work of John Rawls among those working in 
Christian ethics. Harlan Beckley puts the matter well 
as he notes that the emergence of a politically power-
ful Christian right has made vivid a dilemma that 
Christian ethics has still to resolve. "The dilemma is: 
How can an evaluation of the distribution of rights, 
duties, benefits, and burdens which society necessarily 
imposes upon all of its citizens be faithful to Christian 
beliefs without forcing others to accept the distinctive 
moral implications of beliefs they do not and should 
not be required to share?"25 
Neuhaus argues that we need a recovery 
of some substantive account of the 
goods that make a good society 
possible through attending to the 
concrete desires of real people who 
aren't required to leave religion 
behind as they enter the public arena. 
According to Beckley, "This dilemma can only be 
resolved if the justification for principles of justice is 
founded upon general beliefs and values that others 
hold, or can be reasonably expected to hold, and 
which Christians can affirm on the basis of their dis-
tinctive beliefs."26 In order to accomplish this resolu-
tion Beckley argues "that the distinctively Christian 
moral ideal of love obligates those who adhere to it to 
24/bid., p. 230. For one of the ablest critiques of Neuhaus 
see George Marsden, "Secularism and the Public 
Square," This World, 11 (Spring-Summer, 1985), pp. 48-
62. Marsden challenges Neuhaus' contention that religion 
is the morality-bearing part of our culture, thus denying 
Neuhaus' statement of the problem. As Marsden says, 
"Non-theistic secularism also promotes a morality. The 
problem regarding public philosophy is not simply that 
of whether or not we have morality in public life. More 
basically, it is a problem of having competing moral sys-
tems and hence less of a consensus in public philosophy 
than we might like. Putting more religion into public life 
would not resolve this problem unless we decide first 
whose religion it would be. In fact, there is evef! less con-
sensus regarding religion than there is on public 
philosophy; it is difficult to see how adding more religion 
would increase the needed consensus." p. 59. 
25Harlan Beckley, "A Christian Affirmation of Rawls' Idea 
of Justice as Fairness-Part I," Journal of Religious Ethics, 
13, 2 (Fall, 1985), pp. 210-211. 
26/bid., p. 212. 
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embrace the beliefs which undergird John Rawls' idea 
of justice as fairness." 27 Rawls thus becomes the lan-
guage of common grace that continues the project of 
Christianizing America. 
Of course there are disagreements among Christian 
ethicists on this score. Neuhaus, for example, thinks 
Rawls' theory threatens to destroy the individual "by 
depriving him of all those personal particularities that 
are the essence of being an individual."~8 As a result, 
Rawls' account is ahistorical in contradistinction to the 
"Judeo-Christian tradition" which is "premised upon 
the concept of real history, real change, happening in 
an incomplete universe that is still awaiting its prom-
ised fulfillment."29 What is needed, according to 
Neuhaus, is a recovery of some substantive account of 
the goods that make a good society possible through 
attending to the concrete desires of real people who 
are not required to leave their religious convictions be-
hind when they participate in the public arena. 
This same set of issues is at the center of the much 
discussed and praised book Habits of the Heart. For the 
critique of "individualism" that is the hallmark of that 
book is but part of a larger agenda that is in essential 
continuity with the hope to Christianize America. For 
as the authors suggest, in spite of our individualism, 
"we have never been, and still are not, a collection of 
private individuals who, except for a conscious con-
21/bid. 
28Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, p. 257. 
29/bid., p. 258. Neuhaus' criticisms are broad strokes of the 
much more detailed and refined criticism of Rawls of-
fered by Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Jus-
tice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Yet 
Neuhaus does not explain how he can at once criticize 
Rawls on such grounds and yet continue to underwrite 
America as the exemplification of what a Christian social 
order would look like. For whether Neuhaus likes it or 
not, the public philosophy of America is liberal and 
Rawls in many ways is its most eloquent spokesman. 
The very fact that many Christian theologians such as 
Beckley feel the need to adopt Rawls in order to have a 
comprehensive theory of justi<;e may mean something 
has already gone wrong in Christians' understanding of 
the social and political role of the church. Put overly sim-
ple, you need a theory of justice when you no longer as-
sume that the very existence of the church is a social 
stance. Christian thinkers obviously must and can test 
various accounts of justice offered by different societies 
in order to find areas of common cause. But it is quite 
another matter to assume that in order for Christians to 
act politically they need a theory of justice such as Rawls' 
that claims to order the basic structure of society. In that 
respect Beckley's contention that Rawls' theory does not 
pretend to comprehend all of morality fails to adequately 
denote the tendency of Rawls' account to render some 
goods, such as the family, problematic. See, for example, 
A Theory of justice (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 1971), pp. 
511-512. I am indebted to Mr. Greg Jones for helping 
me see this. 
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tract to create a minimal government, have nothing in 
common. Our lives make sense in a thousand ways, 
most of which we are unaware of, because of tradi-
tions that are centuries, if not millennia, old. It is these 
traditions that help us to know that it does make a dif-
ference who we are and how we treat one another. 
But if we owe the meaning of our lives to biblical and 
republican traditions of which we seldom consciously 
think, is there not the danger that the erosion of these 
traditions may eventually deprive us of that meaning 
altogether? We would argue that if we are ever to 
enter that new world that so far has been powerless to 
be born, it will be through reversing modernity's ten-
dency to obliterate all previous culture. We need to 
learn again from the cultural riches of the human 
species and to reappropriate and revitalize those riches 
so that they can speak to our condition today."30 
Which sounds very much like a call for reconstituting 
Christian America. 
I have no interest in trying to resolve the many 
disagreements between Neuhaus, Beckley, Bellah, and 
Falwell. Rather what I have attempted to do is to show 
that the reason Falwell is such a challenge to the 
Christian mainstream in America is not because he is 
so different from them, but because he has basically 
accepted their agenda.31 The Christian right and the 
Christian left do not disagree about the religious status 
of the American experiment. They just disagree about 
what language and/or political theory will allow them 
to accomplish their common goal of making American 
democracy as close as possible to a manifestation of 
God's kingdom. 
III 
For most Christians in America, from the nominal 
Christian, the committed social activist, to the theolo-
30Robert Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart: IndividWllism and 
Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), pp. 282-283. For Bellah's more 
explicit views see his "The Revolution and the Civil Reli-
gion," in Religion and the American Revolution, ed. by 
Jerald Brauer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), pp. 55-73. 
There Bellah observes that when his original article on 
civil religion was published (1967), it came just as the 
existence of civil religion was becoming questionable. He 
observes, "Only the biblical religions can provide the 
energy and vision for a new turn in American history, 
perhaps a new understanding of covenant, which may be 
necessary not only to save ourselves but to keep us from 
destroying the rest of the world." p. 73. 
31Falwell is particularly interesting when he wanders into 
questions of international relations. For suddenly he no 
longer makes direct biblical appeals but sounds like any 
good American realist accepting consequential calcula-
tions for determining the right moral policy. 
November, 1986 
gian, it is simply unthinkable to theorize outside the 
tradition I have just tried to sketch. Yet my refusal to 
support prayer in school is because I find myself out-
side that tradition. That I do so is because I do not 
believe that the universalism that is intrinsic to the 
Christian faith is carried by the culture of the west, 
but instead is to be found first and foremost in the 
church.32 
From this perspective something has already gone 
wrong when Christians think they can ask, "What is 
the best form of society or government?"33 This ques-
tion assumes that Christians should or do have social 
and political power so they can determine the ethos of 
society. That this assumption has long been with us 
does nothing to confirm its truth. 
The Christian right and left disagree 
not about the religious status of 
American democracy but about what 
language and/or political theory will 
allow them to accomplish their common 
goal of making American democracy a 
close approximation of God's kingdom. 
That assumption in short is the heritage of what 
John Howard Yoder has called "The Constantinian 
Sources of Western Social Ethics." It is an assumption 
shared by Christians and non-Christians alike, for the 
very logic of most contemporary philosophical ac-
counts of ethics and social theory accept its essential 
rightness only in secular terms. By calling our atten-
tion to Constantine, Yoder has no stake in determin-
ing the sincerity of Constantine's conversion or 
whether it was exactly at that time that a decisive shift 
in Christian assumptions took place. Rather Constan-
tine is the symbol of the decisive shift in the logic of 
moral argument when Christians ceased being a 
minority and accepted Caesar as a member of the 
church. It is that logic we must understand if a 
genuine Christian critique of Christian America is to 
be made. 
32For an attempt to develop this position see my A Com-
munity of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social 
Ethic (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1981) and 
my The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1983). 
33John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics 
as Gospel (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1984), 
p. 154. When Christians ask such a question they assume 
a m~ority status. In contrast, Yoder's view, as well as my 
own, is that Christians cannot help but be a minority if 
they are being faithful to their basic convictions. 
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The most obvious consequence of the change oc-
casioned by Constantine, according to Yoder, is the 
composition of the church. Prior to that time Chris-
tians had been a minority that at least required some 
degree of adherence. After that time everyone is a 
member. It now takes conviction to be a pagan. As a 
result, Christians are now forced to develop a doctrine 
of the "true church" that remains invisible (136).34 
This shift is of crucial importance for how ethics is 
now understood. Prior to the time of Constantine, 
Christian belief in God's rule of the world was a mat-
ter of faith. However with Constantine providence is 
no longer an object of faith, for God's governance of 
the world is now thought to be empirically evident in 
the person of the Christian ruler. With this changed 
eschatology ethics had to change "because one must 
aim one's behavior at strengthening the regime, and 
because the ruler himself must have very soon some 
approbation and perhaps some guidance as he does 
things the earlier church would have perhaps disap-
proved" (137). As a result, the distinctive character of 
Christian life is now primarily identified with inward-
ness, since everyone by definition is already Christian. 
Once Christianity becomes dominant, moreover, it is 
now thought that moral discourse must be that which 
can direct the behavior of anyone. Servanthood and 
love of enemy, contentment and monogamy, cannot be 
expected of everyone. So a duality develops in ethics 
between "evangelical counsels" for the motivated and 
"precepts" for everyone else. Perhaps even a more sig-
nificant change is the assumption that the decisive 
ethical question becomes "What would happen if 
everyone did it? If everyone gave their wealth away 
what would we do for capital? If everyone loved their 
enemies who would ward off the communists? This ar-
gument could be met on other levels, but here the 
only point is to observe that such reasoning would 
have been preposterous in the early church and re-
mains ludicrous wherever committed Christians accept 
realistically their minority status. Far more fitting than 
'What if everybody did it' would be its inverse, 'What 
if nobody else acted like a Christian and we did?' " 
34All references to Yoder will appear in the text. It should 
not be thought that Yoder is committing the genetic fal-
lacy by his appeal to the early Christian community. He 
is not saying that because the early church was a minority 
it should always be a minority, but rather in this context 
he is working descriptively to show the change in the 
logic of moral argument when this occurred. Of course 
he will argue that the form of the early church is norma-
tive for Christians not because it was the early church but 
because what the early Christians believed is true and re-
sults in Christians taking a critical stance toward the 




With this new universalism comes an increasing 
need to test moral discourse by its effectiveness. Once 
the course of history is thought to be empirically dis-
cernible, and the prosperity of our regime is the meas-
ure of the good, efficacy becomes a decisive test for 
the moral rightness of our action. Self-sacrifice that is 
not tied to some long-term account of result becomes 
irrational. This is particularly important in assessing 
the validity of violence and the Christian's participa-
tion in war. 
What is important about Yoder's depiction of the 
change in moral logic occasioned by the Constantinian 
turn is that the effects he describes are still with us. 
With the Renaissance and Reformation "Christendom" 
is replaced by the nation-state. Christians, however, 
did not respond to this change by maintaining the cos-
mopolitanism of the Holy Roman Empire, but rather 
now maintained that Christian societies could wage 
war on one another in the name of preserving their 
Christian culture. 
With the Enlightenment, the link between church 
and state is broken, but the moral identification of 
Christians with the state remains strong. This is espe-
cially the case in America where "once the separation 
of church and state is seen as theologically desirable, 
a society where this separation is achieved is not a 
35Connected with this reversal is what happens once the 
ruler is let into the church, for then the ruler, not the 
average or weak person, is the model of ethical reason. 
Thus the rightness of truth-telling or the wrongness of 
killing is tested first by whether a ruler can meet such 
standards. Yoder, however, does not mean to exclude 
rulers from the church but rather he expects them to act 
like Christians. Thus "Caesar would be perfectly free (for 
a while) to bring to bear upon the exercise of his office 
the ordinary meaning of the Christian faith. It might 
happen that the result would be that his enemies 
triumph over him, but that often happens to rulers any-
way. It might happen that he would have to suffer, or 
not stay in office all his life, but that too often happens 
to rulers anyway, and it is something that Christians are 
supposed to be ready for. It might happen that he would 
be killed; but most Caesars are killed anyway. It might 
happen that some of his followers would have to suffer. 
But emperors and kings are accustomed to asking people 
to suffer for them. Especially if the view were still au-
thentically alive, which the earlier Christians undeniably 
had held to and which the theologians in the age of Con-
stantine were still repeating that God blesses those who 
serve him, it might also have been possible that, together 
with all of the risks just described, most of which a ruler 
accepts anyway, there could have been in some times and 
some places the possibility that good could be done, that 
creative social alternatives could be discovered, that prob-
lems could be solved, enemies loved and justice fos-
tered." p. 146. 
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pagan society but a nation structured according to the 
will of God. For nearly two centuries, in fact, the lan-
guage of American public discourse was not only re-
ligious, not only Christian, but specifically Protestant. 
Moral identification of church with nation remains de-
spite institutional separation. In fact, forms of institu-
tional interlocking develop which partly deny the 
theory of separation (chaplaincies, tax exemptions)" 
(142). 
If there is to be a genuine Christian critique of 
Christian America, I am convinced that this habit of 
thought, which Yoder calls Constantianism, must be 
given up. Otherwise we Christians remain caught in 
the same habits of thought and behavior that implicitly 
or explicitly assume that insofar as America is a de-
mocracy she is Christian. As a result Christians lose 
exactly the skills necessary to see how deeply they have 
been compromised by the assumption that their task is 
to rule, if not the government, at least the ethos of 
America. 
That is why Christian social strategy in America con-
tinues to be caught in a fateful ambiguity-namely, 
Christians claim that Christianity, or at least religion, 
should be more present in public life yet they want to 
make government itself religiously neutral. The his-
tory of the Supreme Court decisions on church-state 
issues should be enough to convince anyone that there 
is no easy way to resolve this tension in the American 
legal, much less the social and political, system.36 
Am I therefore suggesting that Christians must 
"withdraw" from the social, political, and legal life of 
America? I am certainly not arguing that, but rather 
I am trying to suggest that in order to answer ques-
tions of "why" or "how" Christians participate in the 
life of this country we do not need a theory about the 
Christian character of democracy. Rather I am 
suggesting, with Yoder, that as Christians we would 
"be more relaxed and compulsive about running the 
world if we made our peace with our minority situa-
tion, seeing this neither as a dirty trick of destiny nor 
as some great new progress but simply as the unmask-
ing of the myth of Christendom, which wasn't true 
even when it was believed" (158). 
As Yoder argues, since almost all rulers claim to be 
our benefactors in order to justify their rule, there is 
no reason that Christians cannot use that very lan-
guage to call the rulers to be more humane in their 
ways of governing. Moreover, if we are lucky enough 
to be in a situation where the ruler's language of jus-
tification claims to have the consent of the governed 
36For a romp through church-state issues see George Gold-
berg, Reconsecrating America (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1984). 
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we can use the machinery of democracy for our own 
and our neighbor's advantage. 
But we should not, thereby, be lulled into believing 
that "we the people" are thereby governing ourselves. 
Democracy is still government by elite though it may 
be less oppressive since it uses language in its justifica-
tion that provides ways to mitigate oppressiveness. But 
that does not make democracy, from a Christian point 
of view, different in kind from states of another form 
(158-159). 
Perhaps the hardest habit of thought deriving from 
our Constantianism is the assumption if we do not 
govern then surely society and/or government will fall 
into anarchy or totalitarianism. But I notice no shor-
tage of people willing to rule or any absence of 
ideologies for rule. The problem is not Christians dis-
avowing ruling, but rather that when Christians rule 
they tend to create international and national disorder 
because they have such a calling to make things right. 
To quote Yoder for the last time, if Christians 
"claim for democracy the status of a social institution 
sui generis, we shall inflate ourselves and destroy our 
neighbors through the demonic demands of the claims 
we make for our system and we shall pollute our 
Christian faith by making of it a civil religion. If, on 
the other hand, we protect ouselves from the Constan-
tinianism of that view of democracy, we may find the 
realistic liberty to foster and celebrate relative democ-
ratization as one of the prophetic ministries of a ser-
vant people in a world we do not control" (165-166). 
I am aware that the position I have taken will be a 
surprise to most Christians schooled on the assump-
tion that there is an intrinsic relation between Chris-
tianity and America. Yet I suspect the position will be 
as unwelcome to many who dislike calls like that of 
Neuhaus for a recovery of a role of religion in Amer-
ican life. They want people who still use their private 
time to entertain religious convictions to be willing to 
work to create a social order and corresponding gov-
ernment that relegates those convictions to the private 
sphere. That is done, of course, in the name of creat-
ing a democratic society that is based on universal 
claims justified by reason qua reason. 37 Constantianism 
is a hard habit to break even for those who no longer 
understand themselves to be religious. 
37 It is interesting to observe that most Americans, whether 
religious or secular, continue to take a missionary stance 
for democracy. Americans criticize our government's 
support for non-democratic regimes around the world to 
the point of sometimes advocating intervention against 
nondemocratic regimes. As Yoder observes, "after the 
'Christian west' has lost the naive righteousness with 
which it thought it should export its religion around the 
world, we still seem to have a good conscience about ex-
porting our politics" (151). 
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From this perspective the problem with Yoder (and 
Falwell) is their refusal to find a neutral or at least 
non-confrontational way to state the social implications 
of their religious convictions.38 That is not playing the 
game fairly as it makes religion more public than is 
healthy for an allegedly pluralistic society. After all 
there have to be some limits to our pluralism. 
Of course Yoder might well respond that he is will-
ing on a case-by-case basis pragmatically to use the al-
legedly more universal language of our society. But 
for many I suspect such a pragmatic approach would 
be insufficient. It is not enough to be willing to play 
the game of the putative neutral or objective language 
and procedures of pluralist democracy; you must be 
willing to believe that such a language and procedures 
are truly the form of the society any people anywhere 
would choose if they had the material means, institu-
tional creativity, and philosophical acumen. To chal-
lenge that presumption, as Yoder has, I think is the 
necessary starting point for any genuine Christian 
critique of Christian America. 
IV 
But where does this leave us? If America is not the 
"new Jerusalem" does that mean Christians must seek 
to make America live consistent with secular presup-
positions? In order to make the line between being 
Christian and American clear must we side with those 
who wish to force any religious phenomenon out of 
the public arena? Should we rejoice in the destructive 
kind of individualism that is so graphically displayed 
in Habits of the Heart? Do we not have a stake in sus-
taining a public ethos that might make the rise of 
paganism, which might well use the language of Chris-
tianity, less likely? 
I see no reason that the position I have taken would 
make me give an affirmative answer to these ques-
tions. I believe that Christians should not will that sec-
ular society be more unjust than it already has a ten-
dency to be. Therefore we have a stake in fostering 
those forms of human association that ensure that the 
virtues can be sustained. Virtues make it possible to 
sustain a society committed to working out differences 
short of violence. What I fear, however, is that in the 
absence of those associations we will seek to solve the 
moral anomie of the American people through state 
action or by a coercive reclaiming of Christian 
38By associating Yoder and Falwell at this point, I do not 
mean to deny their obvious differences. Yet they both 
use primary religious language in the public arena with-
out apology. The problem with Falwell is not that he uses 
Christian appeals but that his understanding of Chris-
tianity is so attenuated. 
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America. 
Therefore if I refuse to support prayer in the public 
schools it becomes all the more important that I urge 
Christians to learn to pray authentically as Christians. 
For if Christians reclaim prayer as an end in itself 
rather than as a way to confirm the "Christian nature" 
of our society we will perform our most important 
civic responsibility. For as Origen argued, what more 
important public service can we render than to pray 
that the emperor recognize his or her status as a crea-
ture of God? Such a prayer is no less significant in a 
society that believes "the people" have in fact become 
the emperor. Cl 
Self-Portrait 
Scattered notes, without sequence, like dreams, 
like a life all made up of fragments . 
-Paul Gaugin 
Not a book, Gaugin protests. His hut wears 
its roof of woven cocoa leaves. Breadfruit 
trees surround it, wild bananas stalk humid 
mountains of Atuana gorge. Not a book, but 
memories whose remnants lay in disarray, 
like Van Gogh's atelier in Aries, where oil 
tubes tumble from the color-box; canvasses, 
sketches stack in corners. Still sunblind 
from Van Gogh's yellow chrome on violet, 
Gaugin dreams: Van Gogh again, in Paris, 
where December snow shrouds Rue Lepic. 
Shivering in his sheepskin coat, his hat 
of rabbit fur, he hurries to the outer 
boulevards. Under arm, he tucked "Pink 
Shrimp," wrapped in white butcher paper, to 
trade for rent. Among old iron work, arrows 
cheap paintings, he leaves his still life 
done on pink paper, takes a five-franc coin 
which bounces across the counter, rolls 
into the hand a beggar proffers, in tattered 
shawl and toothless smile-so much for dreams. 
The day grows warm. Sun spills down valley 
like juice from a lemon wedge Gaugin 
squeezed against the goblet's rim; he 
watches water turn into a factory of light 
like Aries after rain. Van Gogh was right. 
Martha M. Vertreace 
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Going Soft and 
Shaping Up 
Richard Maxwell 
Thus far, the big Hollywood 
movies of 1986 are Top Gun and 
Aliens. Since both are silly, I feel a 
bit awkward about wanting to dwell 
on them. Furthermore: isn't the 
contrast already obvious? We suffer 
a right-wing fantasy about strong 
men in their airplanes saving 
America from terrorists-and then, 
just when we thought it was safe to 
go back to the movies, we have to 
sit through a left-wing fantasy of 
the strong woman with her 
machine-gun saving the nuclear 
family from bad corporations and 
monsters who are worse yet. 
Choose your favorite wish-fulfill-
ment: popular culture provides it 
for you, price no object. 
The moral is drawn. Now I plan 
to enjoy myself. As Ferdinand 
Braudel once remarked, "Le bon 
dieu est dans le detail. " What will in-
terest me is the quality of eclecti-
cism in these films, and-by a 
corollary-the kinds of silliness they 
commit, the ways in which they 
struggle with their own political 
and social assumptions. By attempt-
ing this anatomy I accomplish two 
goals. I help save my brain, and 
Richard Maxwell teaches English at 
Valparaiso University and writes regu-
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possibly yours, from turning into 
oatmeal. Moreover, I have the plea-
sure of discerning some surprises 
where all might have seemed 
foreordained. 
We attend Top Gun for shots of 
big planes zooming through the 
sky, doing dangerous stunts while 
thematically appropriate rock music 
plays. Military action is taken to be 
an improved form of sex: "Ah 
think ah'm a-gettin' a hard-on!" 
cries one pilot ecstatically as he ac-
celerates. The producers provide 
lots of these sequences; in between 
we have Tom Cruise trying to bed 
a woman taller than he is (his in-
structor at the Top Gun institute 
for fighter pilots). This difficult but 
worthy project is finally brought to 
a successful conclusion in a low-
rent cottage along a stunning bit of 
southern coast. Why is the low-rent 
cottage still there? Why have con-
dos not gone up? The question re-
mains unanswered as a national 
emergency occurs and Tom, back 
in his plane, helps subdue threaten-
ing MIGs containing pilots quite a 
bit more competent than Ghadaf-
fi 's. 
The important word is "helps." 
Heroes of this sort are supposed to 
triumph all by themselves. We re-
member-nostalgically, some of 
us-how James Caan killed the en-
tire opposing team during the last, 
great game of Rollerball, mostly by 
smashing their brains out with his 
roller-put (or whatever it was 
called). Caan wasn't supposed to do 
that. His corporate sponsors had 
insisted that the team function as a 
team, that no individual stand out 
from the social unit even during 
the excitement of the Superderby 
(or whatever it was called). Against 
all odds, Caan proved that heroes 
are still heroes. 
Even in The Right Stuff-a more 
thoughtful depiction of athletic-mil-
itary heroism-we had Sam Shep-
herd, playing test pilot Chuck 
Yeager, to keep the old lore alive. 
Stuff emphasized the story of the 
first astronauts, but it frequently 
cut to scenes of Yeager-their im-
mediate predecessor-doing crazy, 
spectacular, or just lonesome cow-
boy things (like sitting on his favor-
ite horse, watching his favorite 
plane). 
Grissom, Glenn and the rest may 
have been part of a vast machine 
for public relations and scientific 
research-not Chuck, it was im-
plied. He was out there by himself, 
doing what he had to do. This point 
was somewhat obscured when Stuff 
had its first TV showings and the 
real Chuck Yeager kept coming on 
in motor oil commercials. Nonethe-
less the Yeager legend thrives-and 
with it a longstanding model for 
American heroism. 
What interests me in 
Top Gun and Aliens is 
their eclecticism and, 
as a corollary, the kinds 
of silliness they commit. 
Thus the peculiarity of Top Gun. 
It starts out in traditional fashion, 
with the protagonist demonstrating 
his cool, his ability to think under 
pressure, etc. It also sets up the 
usual conflict. How can somebody 
like this function within the system? 
Don't the qualities that make him a 
good pilot make him an improba-
ble member of a team? (Yeager 
knew he didn't want to be an as-
tronaut.) The (initially) surprising 
part is that this conflict is resolved 
without any of Rollerball's jangling 
glorification of violence or Stuffs 
pseudo-poetic maundering. 
Tom simply learns to conform, 
which in this case means to work 
with the other guys. There are 
events along the way. His partner 
dies, he finds out new things about 
his father, who was also a fighter-
pilot, he has his little romance. 
None of this is convincingly con-
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nected to his sudden integration 
into his fighting unit. Nor-it 
seems in retrospect--does it need 
to be. Tom Cruise has never played 
the kind of guy who would stand 
out from a crowd. 
True, in Risky Business he did 
outrageous things like turning his 
parent's home into a brothel, but 
his real goal was to be admitted to 
Princeton. Risks worked for him as 
a means to an end, i.e., the most 
conventional sort of respectability. 
We might, then, say that the con-
clusion of Top Gun rings true while 
the rest is held in memory as a par-
ticularly improbable fiction. In ef-
fect, we have just witnessed the 
death, the last rites, and the inter-
ment of John Wayne ... 
. . . until h.e is reborn in the per-
son of Sigourney Weaver. Alien 
(1979) lays the groundwork for this 
odd transmigration of souls. After 
he has been inseminated by a slimy 
pod on an unpleasant planet, a crew 
member returns to the spaceship 
Nostromo. Weaver, called Ripley, is 
against admitting him; she argues 
that he should remain in quarantine. 
Somehow he is allowed to enter, a 
determined crab-thing clinging, 
now, to his face. The crab-thing 
drops off and dies but a spiky-
toothed monster bursts from the un-
fortunate crew-member's stomach. 
The Nostromo's computer, Mother, 
tries to ensure that the monster is 
transported back to an organization 
named, simply, The Company. Here 
it will find some sort of horrible mil-
itary use. With the help of Parker, a 
black worker on board the Nostromo, 
Ripley saves the ship's cat from de-
struction and shoots the alien itself 
out of the craft. Mother is "Mother, 
you bitch," the alien "you son of a 
bitch." Ripley defeats them both. 
As has been observed by numer-
ous viewers, Alien has one seemingly 
gratuitous weak point. Why would 
Ripley risk everything going back 
for the cat when it was she who had 
argued against letting in a desper-
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ately-ill crew member? Surely she 
hadn't softened up; she got tougher 
and thought more as the film went 
on, rather than vice-versa. A striking 
Marxist polemic of the time had it 
that Alien booted old-fashioned sen-
timental humanism out the front 
door only to let it in the back 
Games Kavanaugh, October, Sum-
mer, 1980). 
Aliens gives liberals 
their chance to prove 
that they're not wimps, 
that they can outtough 
even Sylvester Stallone. 
I suppose this is true, more or 
less. All the same, the gesture was 
half-hearted, vague, no matter how 
faithfully one tried to clarify it or 
pin it down with clever theoretical 
analyses. It really wasn't clear how 
Alien's liberal cliches (the strong 
woman, the sacrificial black man, the 
sinister corporation) hung together 
. . . if indeed they did . It took a 
sequel, Aliens, to draw out the sillier 
possibilities of this material-which 
proved to harmonize wonderfully 
with the obsessions of its director, 
James Cameron. 
Cameron wrote an early draft of 
Rambo, which was later revised by 
Sylvester Stallone. After that he di-
rected The Terminator, where Arnold 
Schwarzenegger is a ruthless robot-
assassin: Schwarzenegger tries to kill 
the future mother of the man who 
will lead the ultimate human resist-
ance in the coming war of humans 
against machines. 
Aliens synthesizes these motifs. 
Ripley returns to the nasty planet of 
the alien with a group of Vietnam-
veteran-type marines. This time, in-
stead of fighting against the Mother 
computer, she fights against the 
Mother alien (also a "bitch"); instead 
of going back for kitty, she goes 
back for a little girl who has brought 
out her maternal instincts; instead of 
remaining fundamentally cool and 
rational (her character in the origi-
nal film) she becomes a good, i.e., 
feminist and maternal, Rambo-
Cameron's penance for the bad male 
Rambo shaped from his original 
script by Stallone. To fight one 
bitch, she has to become another. 
It's possible to see why Aliens got 
so much attention in certain critical 
quarters. Occasionally one can spot a 
liberal on, let's say, the McLaughlin 
Group (PBS), squeaking that he's 
rougher and more ruthless than Pat 
Buchanan and Caspar Weinberger 
put together. Aliens gives liberals a 
chance to prove that they're not 
wimps, that they can outtough even 
Sylvester Stallone if necessary. The 
paper falling most spectacularly for 
this line was the Village Voice, which 
ran a long and generally admiring 
feature emphasizing the Rambo con-
nection almost to the exclusion of 
everything else. However, this sort 
of admiration assumes a lot-rather 
too much I would think. 
The best that can be said for 
Cameron is that he knows how to 
cook up a plot gripping to any audi-
ence, no matter how limited its at-
tention-span. The worst is that he 
writes and directs as though he had 
never read anything but Marvel 
comic books. There's a lot to be said 
for Marvel comic books-and argu-
ably Cameron's ignorance gives him 
a kind of invincibility. He has the 
strength of ten because his heart is 
pure. On the other hand, thought-
less ignorance seldom permits the 
emergence of a good storyteller, 
especially if his story is designed 
along argumentative lines. 
The moment we inquire into the 
argument behind Aliens' plot, things 
get murky fast. The basic claim 
would have to go as follows: "Ripley 
kills the aliens ruthlessly-in fact she 
embarks on a self-announced pro-
gram of genocide, but good genocide." 
And how can you tell good 
genocide? "First, when it's commit-
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ted on behalf of motherhood; sec-
ond, when it is balanced by tolera-
tion for creatures who are different 
but friendly-like the robot whom 
Ripley learns to trust, despite her 
justified fear of human-like 
machines, even while she is mowing 
down the bad mother and her 
abominable offspring." 
To put the point another way, this 
movie works very hard to establish a 
set of circumstances where anyone, 
no matter how dewy-eyed, can ap-
prove of behavior that out-Rambos 
Rambo. But our guilt in approving 
of such actions is gone: as Mr. Hyde 
cries when he bursts from Jekyll's 
office, "'Free! Free at last!' " 
I eliminated all suspense from this 
essay by drawing a moral at the be-
ginning. The moral can be refined. 
Conservatives out of power tend to 
be a bloodthirsty lot. Since they've 
arrived in vogue and office, they 
have started to become somewhat 
civilized. The desire for military ac-
tion has been satisfied by largely 
symbolic gestures (see William Pfaff, 
The New Yorker, September 15). 
And the charms of even these ges-
tures are starting to wear thin . The 
most telling critiques of the Libyan 
escapade last spring came from 
within the Reagan administration, 
not from useless sods like Tip 
O'Neill. The journey towards reality 
is reflected in a piece of fluff like 
Top Gun, where the typically corpo-
rate character of American achieve-
ment is admitted. Wayne, not to 
mention Ayn Rand, must be stirring 
uneasily in the tomb. The fact re-
mains, "Top Gun" refers not to a 
person but an institution. And an 
educational institution at that. Tom 
Cruise is going to end up as a ten-
ured professor, helping other prom-
ising young warriors get their start. 
However virile, he ts m fact going 
soft. 
Meantime, what does Sigourney 
Weaver's future look like? Within 
the world of the movie her fate is 
unclear. Back in America she would 
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make a great running-mate for 
Mario Cuomo: maybe together they 
can revive the nuclear family, 
though I'm not quite sure what I 
mean here by the term "nuclear." 
Speaking more generally, beware 
of liberals on the warpath. Especially 
when in competition with conserva-
tives, they have a lot to prove. And 
sometimes (witness the Bay of Pigs) 
they're willing to go about proving it 
in the oddest ways. Anyone con-
cerned with the future of the Demo-
cratic Party could do worse than 
take a second look at Aliens. This 
story is about more than fear of crab 
salad. tl 
Still by the Path 
On the shortest day 
of a chill year 
I walked the old 
coast trail 
all the trestles 
taken up 
one or two rusted spikes 
still by the path 
I sat in a column 
of sun. The dog 
lay panting in the dirt 
I pressed fingers 
in a raccoon's handprint 
saw the earth 
pale December brush 
greening upward 
Old spruces lurched 
thick with moss 
An aspen leaned abandoned 
over the beaver creek 
I watched all this 
but what I could tell 
I could not tell 
Hush said the brown grass 
Margaret D. Smith 
The Critique of 
Pure Boredom 
James Combs 
The tradition of the magnum opus 
still lurks in the hearts of many 
academicians. Sitting amidst the 
collected book-and-paper flotsam 
and jetsam of academical accumula-
tion, they plan to write that Big 
Book someday, the book that is the 
fruit of their laborious reflections, 
the remasticated wordworld of 
years of doctoral dyspepsia. 
I suspect that the secret hero of 
such sheepskin-and-gown types is 
Hegel, who spun out a philosophi-
cal system in massive volumes of 
Gothic-castle German prose that 
was so obscure it was taken to be 
the height of profundity. Academic 
castles-in-the-air are built with the 
mortar of obscurantism, collapsing 
only with the eroding force of 
skepticism. It was Zeno who argued 
that the cause of truth advances by 
decreasing the amount of knowl-
edge in the world, but that has 
never been a popular project in the 
hallowed halls of ivy, where 
"knowledge" rises in unpuncturable 
bubbles that float, like Aristopha-
nes' balloon, above the Earth. 
I have decided to write my own 
James Combs teaches Political Science 
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magnum opus. Following Hegel, it 
will be a multi-volume tome enti-
tled The Phenomenology of Pain. My 
thought is that the world is equally 
divided into two irreconcilable and 
eternal groups in endless dialectical 
struggle: those who want to in-
crease the amount of pain in the 
world, and those who want to de-
crease it. But, again as in German 
philosophy, the outcome is not in 
doubt: those who are committed to 
increasing pain always win, and 
those with silly notions such as "live 
and let live" and "let well enough 
alone" always lose. 
History unfolds as the march of 
pain in the world, toward its even-
tual goal of the realization of Abso-
lute Pain. Freud missed the boat 
when he didn't grasp the essential-
ity of the Pain Principle. Michels' 
Law should read, "Whoever says 
organization says pain." Weber's 
"iron cage" of bureaucracy is run 
by experts on the application of 
pain, who constantly bend their ef-
forts towards the question, how do 
we make life more miserable for 
people? 
A glance at the nature of the 
"postmodern" world illustrates the 
triumph of the Will to Pain. We 
live in a "service" economy whose 
chief goal is to make life unservice-
able, to grind everything to a halt, 
make everything unworkable, in-
edible, or insufferable, and create a 
world of total inertia. The service 
economy serves only the cause of 
Pain, and its managers have reason 
to be proud of their accomplish-
ments. The next time you are put 
on hold by a "service representa-
tive" and have to endure ten min-
utes of Musak (while you are pay-
ing for the long distance call), think 
of the pristine beauty of such pain, 
and the genius it takes to think up 
such ecstatic suffering. 
One other contemporary exam-
ple will suffice: education. The 
great think-tanks, whose overall job 
it is to conjure up yet more ways to 
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inflict pain on the world, have re-
cently discovered, through the ex-
cruciating joy of the organized pain 
of committees, that, lo and behold, 
Kids Hate School. Our children, 
not yet appreciative of the funda-
mental necessity of a painful life, 
must be trained from Kindergarten 
on in the ways of pain. Discovery 
that they resist mightily and seek 
pleasures in sex, drugs, rock n'roll, 
and blowing off school sends 
alarms through educational estab-
lishments charged with surplus rep-
ression of the young. Their solu-
tion to the educational "crisis" is, of 
course, utterly predictable: cause 
the students all the more pain-
school till 5:00 the year around; 
homework every night; no recess; 
more science and math; mandatory 
time at the computer. 
Never mind that this will make 
students resentful, neurotic, even 
suicidal; indeed, their agony is 
proof positive that our educational 
"reforms" are working. If they seek 
escape from the expanded drudg-
ery of school in drugs, educators 
have worked a double triumph: 
they first create the conditions of 
daily punishment that drive stu-
dents to drugs, then punish them 
for attempting to escape the unen-
durable. Such organized genius has 
been termed "the politics of degra-
dation": if you first create the cir-
cumstances wherein people are 
forced to live degraded lives, you 
can then degrade them for being 
degraded. If the victims of poverty, 
drugs, school, or other shameful 
things are driven to despair, their 
very despair becomes further occa-
sion for increased degradation. 
In any case, The Phenomenology of 
Pain will be divided into several 
major subjects. As is my wont, I 
will discuss evidence from popular 
culture as proof of the ubiquity of 
pain. The Critique of Pure Bilk will 
deal with the many ways in which 
someone tries to separate us from 
our money. The list is endless, but 
special attention should be given to 
greedy cable companies, Wall 
Street insiders, up-front "finance 
charges," Michael Deaverism, and 
con artists everywhere whose sole 
commitment is to pure bilk. 
A second volume will focus on 
The Critique of Pure Shill. The wide-
spread practice of shilling-lying in 
clever and covert ways-is essential 
to the smooth functioning of a so-
cial order built on deception. If all 
governments are run by liars, then 
too so are all insurance companies 
and used car lots. It is likely still 
the case that the truth is so seldom 
found because it is so seldom 
sought, since it would collapse the 
houses of cards built by the arts of 
shilldom. Societies built on a com-
mitment to truth would end work 
for Presidential spokesmen, Penta-
gon "war is peace" rhetoricians, ad-
vertising agencies, public relations 
firms, Hollywood agents, campaign 
managers, and professional 
wrestlers. 
Another volume would deal with 
The Critique of Pure Sleaze. Sleaze in-
cludes all those tawdry and cheap 
things designed to appeal to pru-
rient interest. They make our lives 
more painful by making us realize 
how much we Jove sleaze, and even 
more how much we love to agonize 
over the massive appeal of sleaze. 
One only has to watch the movies 
that people choose to rent at video-
tape stores to realize that Blood-
sucking Freaks and Ilse, She-wolf of the 
SS outsell My Dinner with Andre. 
One genre of guilty pleasure al-
ways popular in the realm of sleaze 
are women-in-chains movies, 
wherein we take painful pleasure in 
watching sado-masochistic dramas of 
bondage, torture, and female re-
venge. The enjoyment of sleaze lets 
us exercise our demon of repressed 
pathological delights, and the even 
greater pleasure of painful guilt 
over enjoying it. Perhaps this is the 
true social function of pornography: 
pornography lets us dip ourselves 
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into the mire of sleaze, and after-
wards love the pain of removing the 
mud and leeches. 
The reader by now has guessed 
that The Phenomenology of Pain is a 
vast enterprise far beyond my 
meager talents and life expectancy. 
Such a study should be the province 
of a funded Institute for the Study 
of Pain. There some other scholar 
could write The Critique of Pure Ig;no-
rance, dealing with the inexhaustible 
ways that ignorance triumphs over 
intelligence, thereby causing the 
world more pain. Too, a volume 
should be devoted to The Critique of 
Pure Speed, how the concept of 
speed wins out over comfort, for in-
stance in car design, promotion stan-
dards, and beauty contests. 
For my own humble part of this 
great undertaking, I plan to start 
with The Critique of Pure Boredom. 
Boredom is one of the great re-
sources in the arsenal of pain, and 
contemporary institutions have 
made boredom into one of the more 
exquisite tortures inflicted upon us. 
Those who design school curricula, 
for example, are guided by the sole 
question, how do we make school as 
boring as possible? If you write a 
textbook, the publishers insist that 
the text be as devoid of interest as 
possible; they know that those who 
select school texts are concerned not 
only with their orthodoxy but also 
their tedium. In "higher education," 
the concept of the lecture serves a 
similar function, transforming the 
most interesting ideas into a ritual 
drone that destroys any initial glim-
mer of student interest or com-
prehension. It must be the case that 
the goal of education is to teach us 
not how to live, but how to be 
bored. If that is so, then American 
education has succeeded admirably 
in its task. 
This includes political education. 
Civic education has long insisted 
that "citizens" are supposed to take 
an interest in government. Yet the 
truth of the matter is that the estab-
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lished political order defends itself 
by discouraging mass political in-
terest. One of the ways it does this 
is through the mystification of bore-
dom. Governments survive by mak-
ing themselves mysterious, using ar-
cane language and procedures in-
comprehensible to the uninitiated. 
But it also does this in a more subtle 
way: the routines of government are 
made to seem so boring that most 
people conclude that what people do 
in Washington is so dreary as to not 
be worth the effort to understand. 
The routines of 
government are made to 
seem so boring that most 
people conclude that what 
people do in Washington 
is so dreary as not to be 
worth figuring out. 
This function of defensive dron-
ing is without doubt the only reason 
for the existence of the ultimate in 
narrowcasting, C-SP AN (Cable Satel-
lite Public Affairs Network), carry-
ing the doings of the House of Rep-
resentatives, the Senate, Congres-
sional committees, and the many in-
terest groups that surround Federal 
City. All day and night we are 
treated to the endless spectacle of 
talk-talk in hearing rooms, in 
stuffy hotel meeting rooms, at rub-
ber chicken luncheons and dinners, 
in the well of the House. After 
awhile a glaze comes over your eyes 
as you listen to all these well-
dressed, earnest, and usually humor-
less people talk-lawyer talk, policy 
talk, partisan talk, issue talk, techni-
cal talk, even rarely political talk. 
Orwell once said that political 
speech in our time was the defense 
of the indefensible. He was wrong: 
political speech in our time is the de-
fense of the unendurable. C-SP AN 
chronicles the stultifying series of 
scenes of our national political tribes 
talking largely to themselves. Parties, 
interest groups, and thinktanks are 
always talking to themselves, engag-
ing in ritual orgies of self-congratu-
lation and solemn reassurances of 
the benevolence of their motives and 
the relevance of their wisdom. 
Indeed, C-SP AN is a vision of the 
dismal science, political science. The 
dramatis personae of official 
Washington revealed on that chan-
nel are people who have succumbed 
to the ultimate academic folly, tak-
ing political science seriously. Yet 
the triumph of the ethos of political 
science contributes to the true func-
tion of C-SPAN, which is to support 
the cause of mass political alienation 
and acquiescence. 
Nothing could be more forbidding 
to the mass public than the prospect 
of mastering the bleak arts and lan-
guage of that discipline, and therein 
lies C-SPAN's utility. For many view-
ers who happen across those many 
occasions on C-SP AN in which polit-
ical scientists are expounding, it 
must seem to them as if they had 
chanced onto the proceedings of an 
obscure cult conducting odd rituals 
and speaking unfamiliar shibboleths. 
What they are actually seeing is an 
image of academic Hell, an eternal 
political science convention which 
you are damned forever to attend, 
condemned to sit in hotel meeting 
rooms listening to papers and pass-
ing resolutions on a beautiful spring 
day in San Francisco. 
Yet C-SP AN does offer us a 
glimpse of the American political 
condition. Watching the insubstan-
tial pageant of speakers and groups 
that parades across the TV screen 
convinces me that we are witnessing 
a nation in the throes of imperial 
stagnation. The political portrait 
that shimmers before us is of a state 
of political decay, without the cross-
ventilation and -pollination of 
dialogue, devoid of the political 
passions of mass movements, a giant 
languishing in the frustrations of its 
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own creation. 
The actors in the C-SP AN dramas 
occupy themselves with the kind of 
otherworldly concerns one associates 
with the clerics of the Fourth Cen-
tury A.D., polishing their points of 
arcane policy analysis and rhetorical 
flourishes in the isolation of the 
monasteries of official Washington 
while the temporal march of world 
history passes inexorably by. Ar-
cheologists of the twenty-seventh 
century studying the ruined temples 
of Washington will be able to point 
to many signs of our political de-
mise, but none more telling than the 
scene of lone Congressmen warning 
of our impending fate speaking to 
an empty House of Representatives 
and watched out in TVland by prac-
tically no one. 
Political boredom, then, is a 
symptom of our political elite's ina-
bility to cope with the facts of our 
political condition. Their reaction is 
not one of hysteria but of self-reas-
surance, that things are as they ever 
were, that the same ideas and habits 
that have served us in the past still 
work, that our destiny is still glori-
ous despite the obvious historical 
facts unfolding before us . Boredom 
emerges when people have nothing 
new to say, no spark of creativity or 
daring, wherein the pain of pure 
boredom is preferable to the pain of 
reality-testing. There they stand, 
talking on C-SP AN, paragons of 
boredom, defending a dead Center 
that cannot hold , visiting mere 
stupefication on the world. 
As the decades of the near future 
unfold, they will talk us to death, 
cushioning the pain of our passage 
into senescence by the steady drone 
of public talk, mastering everything 
in word but nothing in deed. When 
the day comes in the future that C-
SP AN is thankfully turned off, the 
people on that channel will not be 
missed. They will have achieved the 
political Nirvana of pure boredom 
and can disappear into the transcend-
ent void of past Television, ephem-
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era of a terminally epigonic time. 
They had found unity in the oppo-
sites of pain and pleasure, and as-
cended into irrelevance through 
their exercise of mystical powers re-
served only for the spiritual disci-
pline of boredom. 
It is not the first time observers 
have witnessed the intellectual va-
cancy of an imperial power at the 
point of its descent into rhetorical 
self-assurance in defiance of history. 
One does not even have to go back 
to Thucydides. Recall Ralph Waldo 
Emerson's thoughts on England in 
decline: "It was as if inspiration had 
ceased, as if no vast hope, no reli-
gion, no analogy, existed any more. 
. . . " Intelligence was "choked by the 
great consciousness of power and 
money and rightness .... " Imperial 
England was like "walking on a mar-
ble floor where nothing will grow." 
C-SPAN, I fear, shows us nothing 
but marble floors where no political 
gardens are cultivated and no new 
and nourishing political plants can 
thrive. Cl 
Untold Lives 
They have hooked the porch swing 
to the ceiling and turned the picnic table 
upside down, its legs two x's 
crossing out the easy seasons past. 
There is so much unfinished business. 
The cold rains keep coming 
pulling leaves to earth 
bedding them thick and wet 
in blackened sod. 
Straggler sparrows dart south in twos and threes. 
And so much still unspoken. 
The skies lower, darken. 
Squirrels race final acorns 
home to storage in aching cheeks 
and inside, Gra_ndfather tilts his rocker 
before the fire, angling his shadow 
back and forth across the floor. 
So many plans overturned. So many hopes suspended. 
How will we know, when snows 
begin their final blurring, 
smoothing furrows and fields to a shadowless sleep, 
Grandfather, how will we know 
what you have left untold? 
Ruth El Saffar 
The Cresset 
The Horror at the 
Heart of Farce 
John Steven Paul 
At the close of the 1986 Strat-
ford Shakespeare Festival's produc-
tion of The Resistible Rise of Arturo 
Ui, the actor who portrayed Arturo 
comes downstage--out of character 
now-and instructs the audience as 
follows: 
If we could learn to look instead of 
gawking, 
We'd see the horror at the heart of 
farce ... 
Stratford had horror and farce 
on its collective mind this season. 
While the Festival Stage was home 
to the Romances, several of the 
plays at the Avon and the Third 
Stage turned on the juxtaposition 
of fear and laughter. 
The Young Company of the 
Stratford Festival performed in 
tandem Bertolt Brecht's parable 
about the horrible rise of Adolph 
Hitler from mobster to fuehrer and 
Shakespeare's Macbeth. The Scot-
tish tragedy is the model of mixing 
farce with horror. No more have 
the butcher and his fiend-like 
queen left the stage, their hands 
John Steven Paul teaches in the De-
partment of Communication at Valpa-
raiso University and writes regularly on 
Theatre for The Cresset. 
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dripping with Duncan's blood, than 
a drunken porter enters to deliver 
his ribald dissertation on making 
water. (Significantly, the porter was 
played by Maurice Godin, who also 
played Arturo Ui.) 
Arturo Ui seems an appropriate 
choice for production by the Strat-
ford Festival. Brecht wrote the play 
in 1941 while exiled in Finland. He 
wished it to be performed in "the 
grand style." Composed in a 
slightly imperfect form of blank 
verse, the text sounds "Shakespea-
rean." Brecht quotes Shakespeare 
frequently: Arturo learns to speak 
Antony's funeral speech in its en-
tirety, he cons an influential widow 
in the presence of her dead hus-
band's casket in the style of 
Richard III's wooing of Lady 
Anne, and Arturo's rise itself is 
reminiscent of Macbeth's. 
Brecht's "epic" dramaturgy owes 
much to Shakespeare. The English 
chronicle plays, especially, are both 
grand and episodic, ranging freely 
over time and space. Shakespeare's 
concept of acting owed much more 
to the rhetorical tradition than to 
any notion of psychological believa-
bility. The Elizabethan would no 
doubt have found the Stanislavski 
system to be as ineffectual as 
Brecht judged it to be contempti-
ble. 
From Brecht's substantial theoret-
ic wntmgs and evidence from 
Shakespeare's plays, we know that 
they were not only theatre artists 
but theatre scientists, even theatre 
mechanics. They were dedicated to 
knowing how the theatre works on 
its audiences. They were committed 
to developing their ability to make 
a-ffective as well as e-ffective plays 
for the theatre. The Shakespearean 
corpus is a compendium of 
rhythmic patterns, alternations of 
crowd scenes with intimate scenes, 
soliloquies and public addresses, 
realism and fantasy, as well as hor-
ror and farce: all designed to catch 
and hold an audience's attention. 
For if the groundlings were rest-
less, no one at the Globe would be 
able to hear, much less grasp the 
meaning of the poetry. 
The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui 
communicates to a 1986 audience 
on several levels. The action is set 
in Chicago and Cicero, Illinois, ter-
ritory for which "legitimate" 
businessmen and gangsters fought 
for control. Dogsborough (cf. Dog-
berry in Much Ado About Nothing) is 
an aging, corruptible alderman 
bribed by a group of food 
suppliers, known as the Cauliflower 
Trust, to provide it with a special 
subsidy. Arturo Ui is a gang leader 
seeking the official endorsement as 
"protector" of the local grocers 
against such calamities as arson and 
murder. Such protection, of course, 
doesn't come cheap. 
The Young Company of 
the Stratford Festival 
performed in tandem 
Brecht's parable of the 
rise of Hitler from 
mobster to fuehrer and 
Shakespeare's Macbeth. 
Arturo wins his endorsement by 
blackmailing Dogsborough with the 
threat of exposing his corrupt deal-
ings, by intimidating the Trust, by 
brutally maintaining control over 
his own gang, and by demonstrat-
ing to the local grocers that he is 
presenting them with an offer they 
can't refuse. Finally all the grocers 
in Chicago and Cicero "vote" to 
pay for Arturo's high-priced pro-
tection. 
Brecht's parable traces Adolph 
Hitler's rise to power, a fascinating 
story in itself. In Brecht's parable, 
Dogsborough is Hindenburg, presi-
dent of the fast-failing Weimar Re-
public, who was co-opted by the 
Prussian Junkers (i.e., the Cauli-
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flower Trust). Arturo is an out-of-
town gangster, "a simple son of 
Brooklyn," who paid his way 
through college painting houses 
and later came to Chicago with 
seven buddies. Among them were 
Roma( =Roehm), Giri( =Goering), 
and Givola( = Goebbels). There is a 
warehouse fire which stands for the 
burning of the Reichstag building 
in 1933. "The Night of the Long 
Knives," in which Roehm and a 
hundred of his men were murdered 
on Hitler's orders, becomes a hotel 
room scene where Arturo and Giri 
murder Roma and some of his un-
derlings. Brecht's Cicero is Austria 
and from there Arturo will move 
into "Detroit, Washington, Mil-
waukee ... " a/kla Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Sudetenland, etc. 
Arturo is an out-of-town 
gangster, "a simple son 
of Brooklyn," who paid 
his way through college 
painting houses and 
later came to Chicago 
with seven buddies. 
Even the thought of the names 
and deeds associated with the 
Third Reich is unsettling. Images 
reminiscent of the black swastika in 
the white circle on the red field 
evoke horror. The horror show is 
potentially the most emotionally en-
gaging of the dramatic genres. But 
Brecht's theatre practice and drama 
were grounded in his cardinal prin-
ciple that an audience must not be 
allowed to become emotionally en-
gaged in the performance. Brecht 
had no desire for his audience to 
suspend its disbelief, willingly or 
otherwise. For in relinquishing its 
disbelief the audience was likely 
also to have its reason extinguished 
in a bath of emotion. Keep the au-
dience skeptical; keep them think-
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in g. 
So Brecht led his action through 
a series of dramatic and theatrical 
devices that he designed to jolt his 
audience back to an intellectual dis-
tance. The drama is based on in-
congruity. How is it that gangsters 
out of Chicago are spouting blank 
verse suggestive of Shakespeare? 
Such a linguistic choice might raise 
his characters to archetypes, but 
the lines themselves are often 
hilarious: 
ARTURO. I did it all alone but for 
the help 
Of seven solid buddies standing by 
Without a pot to piss in, like my-
self, 
But firm in our determination, sir, 
To carve ourselves that little piece 
of goose 
Which God Almighty cooks for 
every Christian. 
Further, the pettiness of their ac-
tions-thievery, thuggery, name-
calling, firesetting, even the occa-
sional casual murder-reminds the 
audience that these monsters were 
really only bullies and punks. 
In the theatre, Brecht exposed 
all the machinery that the creators 
of illusionistic productions had so 
carefully hidden. We take many 
such innovations as hanging electric 
lighting instruments in full view of 
the audience for granted now. 
Each of these devices was designed 
to keep the audience aware that 
they were present in a theatre and 
that the action onstage was a 
show-not real life. As a show, it 
was the content that should be 
critiqued, not the means of produc-
tion. A good Brechtian production 
can be an exciting theatre piece 
precisely because it is so openly 
theatrical. 
The Stratford director, Tom 
Kerr, has loaded his production 
with Brechtian theatre devices. The 
early scenes are bordered by a 
torch singer, "Dockdaisy," and her 
rendition of "Chicago, Chicago, 
That Toddlin' Town." Later there 
is other, less distinguished singing. 
The faces of the cast are painted 
with clown-white make-up (which 
has the extra benefit of distracting 
us from the youthfulness of the ac-
tors playing middle-aged and el-
derly roles). 
Brecht's "titles," which he meant 
to have projected on a screen above 
the stage, have been transformed 
into newspaper headlines. The ti-
tles were the playwright's primary 
means of connecting Arturo Ui with 
historical Berlin in the Thirties. 
The headlines scream out the de-
velopments in Hitler's rise to 
power, but the device doesn't work. 
The audience is too far from the 
headlines to be able to read them 
and so they become not distancing 
but distracting. 
The most troublesome part of 
the production is the prologue. It is 
visually and verbally confusing. 
Brecht used the prologue to intro-
duce us to his characters. As the 
focus shifts to each actor, he stands 
on a large wooden box painted to 
look like a toy block with a portrait 
of the character's historical coun-
terpart executed on one side. That 
Arturo Ui is standing above Hitler's 
portrait is clear enough and Dogs-
borough's visual connection with 
Hindenburg is detectable, but the 
relationship between the other ac-
tors and the pictures on their boxes 
was confusing and annoying. 
But none of the details could 
seriously detract from the power 
and pleasure delivered by this pro-
duction. The energetic young cast 
was a perfect match for Brecht's 
combination clown show and hor-
ror story. Their acting struck the 
compromise between psychological 
realism which an American audi-
ence seeks and the presentational 
style that Brecht demanded. (I wish 
I could be as enthusiastic about the 
Macbeth.) 
Maurice Godin, in the title role, 
was outstanding. He alone would 
give us reason to watch the Strat-
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ford Company in the future. God-
in is able to transform Arturo from 
a shrill, petulant forty-year-old ado-
lescent to a hypnotizing dema-
gogue, while retaining the laugha-
ble demeanor of Charlie Chaplin 
in "The Great Dictator." Godin 
m1m1cs the all-too-recognizable 
Hitler mannerisms without 
parodying them. Parody, as 
Brecht himself warned, could pre-
clude the horror. 
The centerpiece of this 
production is the 
tutoring scene. Arturo, 
sensing that he is not 
sufficiently impressive, 
calls for an actor to 
teach him the grand style. 
The centerpiece of this produc-
tion is the tutoring scene. Arturo, 
sensing that he is not sufficiently 
impresssive, calls for an actor to 
teach him the grand style. (That 
style, Brecht slyly inserts, got the 
Actor fired for applying Shakes-
pearean technique to an Ibsen 
role!) The Actor, superbly played 
by Lee MacDougall, gives Arturo a 
series of highly artificial hints-
keep your head up, as you walk, let 
your toes touch the ground first, 
fold your hands over your geni-
tals-that together shockingly turns 
Arturo into an only slightly 
exaggerated image of Hitler. Later, 
Arturo reinforces his demagoguery 
with his new style to impress the 
grocers. Underneath the speech is 
played Wagner's overture to The 
Flying Dutchman and the most evil 
of cartoons is complete. Some of 
the audience continued to laugh. 
Others of us looked on with won-
der and dismay, which we undoubt-
edly shared with Brecht. What hath 
the Actor wrought? How is it 
within the power of actors and act-
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ing to turn the world upside down 
by simply being very good at what 
they do? How dangerous it is when 
the wrong people capture the per-
suasiveness of the Actor for them-
selves. (And also, of course, how 
the power of acting might be used 
to set the world right!) 
Actors and acting are also at the 
center of Tom Stoppard's Rosen-
crantz and Guildenstern are Dead. 
Stoppard, like Brecht and Shake-
speare before him, is fascinated by 
the theatre and theatre people, and 
by theatre issues, notably the ques-
tion of reality and illusion: the sub-
stance of the one, the creation of 
the other. It would take much too 
much space to do this play the jus-
tice in analysis that it deserves. Suf-
fice it to say that the play is Hamlet 
viewed through the eyes of two 
characters who, in production, are 
often cut out of Hamlet: Rosen-
crantz and Guildenstern. The only 
Hamlet lines that we hear are those 
spoken in the presence of these two 
minor characters in the Tragedy. 
The remainder is made up of the 
two passing time and waiting for 
something to happen. The result-
ing combination is one of the truly 
great plays of our time. On one of 
its many levels, the play speaks to 
the question of acting on the vari-
ous stages of life. 
Let me throw critical shilly-shally-
ing aside here and say, with 
genuine gratitude, that viewing the 
Stratford Festival production of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are 
Dead was one of the best times I 
ever had in the theatre. Stoppard 
has yet to write a better or richer 
play than this, his first major one 
that premiered in 1967. William 
Dunlop and Keith Dinicol as the 
leads found all the humor, pathos, 
anger, and charm that Stoppard in-
fused into Shakespeare's own 
Hardy and Laurel. The play was 
set in the later Edwardian period, 
and the two were decked out in 
identical dusters and motoring gog-
gles covering their British tweeds. 
They carried plaid valises, which 
looked as if they might hold all the 
material accoutrements of their lit-
tle lives. 
John Wood's direction pointed 
up much if not all the meaning in 
Stoppard's dense, multivalent text. 
Every time we had a moment to 
consider whether with this play 
Bernard Shaw had really been 
matched, another epigram zinged 
past and we were refocused toward 
the vast stage at the A von Theatre, 
happy prisoners of the production. 
And John Wood was working 
with a handicap. R & G was per-
fectly paired with John Neville's 
production of Hamlet. The same ac-
tors played the same roles in both 
productions; Hamlet too was set in 
the Edwardian era (a popular 
choice lately, but save that for 
another time). Neville's Hamlet was 
extremely lovely and light-footed. 
In but three hours and fifteen min-
naming the child 
one word 
curl of a child 
a morning wind 
and wing of a word 
a garden sun 
and sing of a word 
sweetcake child 
on a tender loom 
sleepening soft 
in your mother's womb 
here in the heart 
of things to be 
the rose of your word 
rings out to me 
joan vayo 
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utes, the director got all the 
humorous values and the play be-
came as much a high comedy in 
the drawing room as it did a high 
tragedy on the battlements. On the 
face of it, I would not call this in-
terpretation wrong. Indeed, it was 
in some ways refreshing. The New 
York Shakespeare Festival's pro-
duction of Hamlet last spring was 
ponderous, black, occasionally 
wrenching, but too often tedious. 
The cleverness of Tom Stoppard 
and the beauty of Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstem Are Dead, however, is 
that the existential farce at the 
heart of the Hamlet tragedy is 
gradually laid bare for the two 
blokes. If Hamlet is a comedy, the 
conceit breaks down. Indeed, in 
this R & G, the Hamlet players were 
playing farce, and thus there was 
no distinction between Shake-
speare's characters and Stoppard's. 
It was clear that the Elsinore crowd 
was nutty; there wasn't as much for 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to 
discover. 
R & G have been sent for. 
They're not exactly sure who has 
summoned them, or why, or what 
will happen to them when they get 
to the castle at Elsinore. But they've 
been sent for, and it must be im-
portant. From the beginning, they 
have little control over their lives; 
they will spend most of the time 
spectating. 
On the road they encounter a 
troupe of actors, which will become 
the mediating force between them 
and the Hamlet characters. These 
actors in many ways resemble the 
Actor in Arturo Ui. They play in the 
grand style (you'll remember the 
Hecuba setpiece from Hamlet) and 
just at the moment they are down 
on their luck. Typically, the actors 
are overjoyed at finding an audi-
ence-anywhere. When R & G in-
quire into their specialties, their 
leader lets it be known, with a very 
meaningful glint in his eye, that 
they'll do anything desired. How-
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ever, their true specialty is death 
and killing. Some of the troupe are 
better at killing, others are better at 
dying: "they work as a team." 
When they meet the actors, R & G 
are momentarily amused. When 
the actors move on, the two are a 
bit unsettled. 
The next time R & G meet the 
actors, they are in dress rehearsal 
for The Murder of Gonzago, the play 
that Hamlet called for. It is an 
especially sensational piece, chock 
full of sex and violence and death. 
But Guildenstern is especially dis-
dainful of these actors, whose idea 
of death , he says, is the manipula-
tion of the mechanics of cheap 
melodrama. He instructs them with 
deeply ironic prescience: 
GUILDENSTERN . . . . it's not 
gasps and blood and falling 
about-that isn't what makes it 
death. It's just a man failing to 
reappear, that's all-now you see 
him, now you don't, that's the only 
thing that's real: here one minute 
and gone the next and never com-
ing back-an exit, unobtrusive and 
unannounced .... 
We will hear that this is how 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
die--off-stage-after they've handed 
the letter from Hamlet to the En-
glish king. In the theatre, their 
time ends with spotlight snapped 
off. In the meantime, they have re-
mained on the sidelines, watching 
an unseemly melodrama played out 
by the Danish royal family, and 
within that another melodrama 
played out by a troupe of decadent 
actors . It all begins to appear to 
them a a kind of absurd farce. It 
might even have been funny, until 
the horror dawns on them in the 
persons of a pair of spies dressed 
in dusters, and motoring goggles, 
and carrying plaid valises, who are 
rubbed out in the final scene of The 
Murder of Gonzago. 
I would be remiss if I didn't tell 
you that at the very end of John 
Wood's production, R & G are seen 
riding off into the sunset with the 
actors sitting atop their coach. It is 
a cryptic ending, not to be found in 
the script. It is a further elabora-
tion of Stoppard's conundrums 
knotting up illusion and reality. For 
Guildenstern, joining these actors 
may be the final horror. Or 
perhaps he is simply grateful for 
their performance, which has 
taught him to look instead of gawk, 
and has joined on to lend a hand 
cleaning up the stage blood. ~~ 
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Paul H. Brietzke 
Recent events in Haiti, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, and 
elsewhere have prompted desultory 
reflections about America's foreign 
policy goals. Our media has shown 
many Filippinos blaming us for 
Marcos and Haitians blaming us for 
the Duvaliers. We have often car-
ried this can before: for Nicara-
gua's Somoza, for the Shah in Iran 
and Haile Selassie in Ethopia, for 
Batista's Cuba, for Chiang Kai-Shek 
m the China that never was 
Taiwan. Whether and how we can 
stop backing the wrong horse in 
foreign races is the subject of this 
column. 
If our foreign policies seem an-
tique and arcane, this may be be-
cause the policies trace their inspi-
ration back to 1815. In that year, 
Austria's Prince Metternich (with 
some help) established the "balance 
of power" of the Congress of Vi-
enna. This balance consisted of, in 
effect, several games of musical 
chairs played simultaneously. 
Countries periodically left standing 
when the music stopped (after 
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J.D. and the Ph.D. degrees. He is the 
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World Wars I and II and many less 
serious incidents) got absorbed by 
players strong enough to claim a 
seat. So many players were ab-
sorbed over time that the games 
had to be consolidated. 
Many observers now see only one 
Game left with two players-"us" 
and "them"-and, we fear, only 
one seat. If the music were to stop, 
the player that is stronger, if only 
by one client-state or ICBM, would 
win the remaining seat and declare 
the Game at an end forever. We 
thus acquire missiles and clients as 
if there is no tomorrow. Better 
hold on to any Third World leader 
we think of as ours, no matter how 
corrupt, how repressive, how in-
competent and unable to adjust to 
change. These are the traits shared 
by the Duvaliers, Marcos, Somoza, 
Batista, Chiang, the Shah, and the 
Emperor. 
Admittedly, Americans sat on the 
sidelines for many years 
(isolationism), watching with faint 
amusement while others raced 
around in the circles of musical 
chairs. But we somehow came to 
believe what we were told after 
World War II: a "World Power" 
like us cannot not play the Game. 
Our instructors-Hans Morgen-
thau, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, etc.-were mostly im-
migrants thoroughly steeped in the 
traditions of Vienna and of con-
gresses of all sorts. The instructors 
never told us that a democratic 
foreign policy would necessarily 
lack the secrecy and decisiveness 
that made Bismarck's gamesman-
ship (a balance of power Realpolitik) 
so effective. 
Prussia's, and then Germany's, 
Bismarck could buy off his public 
with welfare measures and dreams 
of glory, and he could force an ef-
ficient bureaucracy and a prideful 
military to do his bidding. Lacking 
these game advantages, American 
decisionmakers can at best emulate 
the defensive balance-of-power 
policies of Austria's Metternich. 
These are policies suitable only for 
a great power on the decline. 
Like nineteenth-century Austria, 
America seeks to hold existing lines 
at all points, regardless of the 
longer-term consequences. This 
policy made sense for an Austria 
which was going to go into eclipse 
in the long run anyway-something 
Metternich seemed to sense. But 
this policy seems at odds with 
America's very real power. Why 
give up prematurely, particularly if 
President Reagan is right in saying 
that "America is back"? Why sup-
port the kind of Third World des-
pot described earlier, when we 
know that America's interests will 
turn on what his domestic oppo-
nents are doing only a few years 
later? Are our defenses as weak as 
nineteenth-centurey Austria's, prone 
to collapse like a flimsy wall when 
a few (client-state) bricks are pulled 
out? 
If we still have power 
yet cannot play the 
Game effectively, why 
not use this power to 
change the Game and 
invent new games that 
we can play effectively? 
The danger is that, following 
Austrian policies, we will become 
an Austria over time. If we still 
have power yet cannot play the 
Game effectively, why not use this 
power to change the Game and in-
vent new games that we can play 
effectively? Some Third World 
countries are trying to change the 
Game through the Nonaligned 
Movement, but they lack the power 
to be really successful. 
Palestinians, on the other hand, 
were never allowed to play the 
Game, so they invented a new 
game and seek to compel others to 
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play, as do the IRA, OPEC, and 
some Islamic fundamentalists. The 
United Nations is particularly 
popular among Third World coun-
tries: musical chairs is played, yet, 
when the music stops, everyone ex-
cept Israel and South Africa has a 
viable seat-at least in the General 
Assembly. Why don't we follow 
suit and create games more to our 
liking and to our own, democratic 
advantage? 
Democracy begins at home, but if 
we show only autocracy and the 
mailed fist abroad, our democracy 
comes to smack of hypocrisy. Even 
worse for us, the perceived need 
for autocracy abroad becomes a 
convenient justification for curbs 
on democracy at home. Our 
foreign policy Game-players cannot 
act with confidence while receiving 
stabs in the back from the home 
front. Call this the Vietnam Syn-
drome, interpret it how you like; 
apparently we must sacrifice either 
democracy or those diplomatidmili-
tary ventures that will fail for lack 
of sustained public support. A 
bipartisan, consensus foreign policy 
has eluded us precisely because 
consensus was sought for the de-
fensive balance-of-power policies 
that are seen by some to have 
failed over the past fifteen years. 
It is both the strength and weak-
ness of a genuinely democratic 
foreign policy that it must be firmly 
anchored in public opinion. Presi-
dents and Congress reflect this opin-
ion only imperfectly, chiefly because 
they try to manipulate rather than 
listen to it. You cannot fool most of 
the people for very long; manipula-
tion, perceived as undemocratic, 
eventually leads to the dissolution of 
a foreign policy consensus based on 
false premises. 
Since Vietnam at least, the prem-
ise of unmanipulated public opinion 
is rather easy to state. It is the 
Golden Rule of doing unto other 
countries what we would have them 
do unto us. That is, we try to display 
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a great deal of sympathy and to pro-
vide limited amounts of real help. 
But because we want no foreign in-
terventions here, Americans wish to 
intervene abroad only on the 
clearest proof of a government seri-
ously harming others, its citizens, 
and/or ourselves. 
Americans know something that 
their foreign policy "experts" do 
not: recently-stated Administration 
goals of a "free and independent" 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are im-
plausible and all but irrelevant to 
our security (as opposed to Game) 
interests. Public opinion here seems 
to follow John Stuart Mill's "princi-
ple of self-regarding conduct." That 
is, we want to support a foreign re-
gime only if we, as its citizens, would 
be prepared to live under that re-
gime. 
You can't fool most of 
the people for very long; 
manipulation, perceived 
as undemocratic, leads 
finally to a collapse 
of a policy consensus 
based on false premises. 
This amounts to a principle of 
empathy: Americans realize that life 
abroad is not like life in America, 
and that life could be made at least 
tolerable within the socio-economic 
constraints a foreign regime faces. 
Rebels in Nicaragua and Afghani-
stan, and the incumbents in Pakis-
tan, flunk this test and thus receive 
little support from the American 
public. 
Mill's principle offers a more reli-
able basis for our foreign policy 
than does a balance-of-power poli-
tics. The public is admittedly fickle 
or ignorant on occasion. But an in-
formed, unmanipulated public opin-
ion would not have tolerated ardent 
and protracted support for Marcos, 
Somoza, et al. A policy based on this 
opm10n would have been to 
America's advantage. More to the 
point, an unmanipulated American 
public would give little support to 
extant leaders who are corrupt, re-
pressive, and incompetent: the cur-
rent South African regime, King 
Hassan of Morocco, Mobuto of 
Zaire, the Saudi princes, and a 
dozen or so others. 
Paradoxically, our government 
gives its strongest support to re-
gimes such as these-perhaps be-
cause they are most at risk of being 
overthrown-regimes that merit the 
least support from the American 
public. The paradox is compounded 
when the Soviet Union, with less to 
worry about from its public's opin-
ion, can frequently take the side of 
the angels: the opposite side that the 
American public would be on, if it 
could. 
The Soviets are also playing the 
Game, of course. Fortunately, they 
seem no more adroit than us. They 
could hardly cope with a few more 
"successes" like Afghanistan, Ethi-
opia, and even Cuba. In any event, 
all regimes aspire to the substance 
rather than the pretense of sover-
eignty; there is little to choose be-
tween being a Soviet puppet and 
being ours. 
President Carter fell in with the 
Brzezinski Gamesmanship that used 
to be called brinksmanship under 
John Foster Dulles. But Carter also 
sensed a basis for the slow reorient-
ing of American foreign policy: re-
warding and sometimes punishing 
regimes according to their records 
on human rights and development. 
This is the kind of foreign policy 
that could command a consensus be-
cause Americans empathize with 
credible efforts to promote free-
dom and well-being. 
Like much else during the Carter 
Administration, this policy was im-
plemented so incompetently as to 
give it a bad name. It should be res-
urrected m a more imaginative 
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form, if for no other reason than 
that certain regimes deserve our 
strongest support under it. Argen-
tina, Brazil, and the Philippines-
genuine democracies emerging from 
long nights of military/martial law 
rule, taking hesitant steps to pro-
mote development and punish hu-
man rights abuses-are for these laud-
able reasons the strongest bulwarks 
against communism in their regions. 
We support these regimes, of 
course, but we should underline our 
pleasure with much additional sup-
port. 
There are stable regimes in other 
countries, which make serious 
human rights and development ef-
forts yet are guilty of a recurrent 
backsliding. Tanzania, Zambia, Ken-
ya, Algeria, Costa Rica, India, and 
Malaysia come to mind. Such re-
gimes should receive our moderate 
support, with reliable promises of 
more support forthcoming as addi-
tional progress is made. 
With much of our bilateral 
foreign aid and diplomatic support 
spent in this fashion, most other 
Third World countries should be 
treated to our benign neglect. They 
should get prompt humanitarian aid 
when needed. Imaginative ways to 
deliver such aid, with a minimum of 
siphoning-off by a regime deserving 
our neglect, must be developed 
along the lines pioneered by Oxfam 
and Save the Children. 
Opposition groups which offer 
credible, desired alternatives to these 
regimes should get our support. 
This support would have to be cau-
tious and non-military, and Ameri-
cans would have to realize that the 
alternative these groups propose 
would be a social democracy rather 
than our beloved liberal democracy. 
Only a few "outlaw" regimes merit 
our active opposition. Chile's and 
South Africa's are rather obvious 
examples; Nicaragua's has done 
nothing to warrant more than our 
benign neglect. 
Needless to say, the foreign policy 
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I outline is very different from the 
Reagan Administration's. Its officials 
score the Game by coloring a world 
map either in red (them) or in blue 
(us). But you can see progress even 
there, if you look hard enough. 
President Reagan did not support 
Marcos and Baby Doc Duvalier 
down to their last gasp. The Great 
Communicator has not been very 
successful in communicating some of 
his wilder foreign policy aims. 
This brings us to what is perhaps 
the most difficult aspect of a demo-
cratic foreign policy: how can we in-
sure that information is not manipu-
lated and that the public takes an in-
terest in it? The short answer is that 
we cannot. To be a politician is to 
manipulate information to your ad-
vantage, if you can get away with it. 
The foreign policy I 
outline is very different 
from the Reagan 
Administration's. It 
scores the Game by 
coloring the map either 
red (them) or blue (us). 
The least we can hope for is that 
our media is sufficiently free for the 
truth to come out eventually. The 
public will then take an interest and 
even punish the manipulators if the 
truth is sufficiently outrageous. Re-
collecting Vietnam, this process can 
take a long time. Reagan can appar-
ently "get away with" Grenada or 
Libya-the whole thing is over be-
fore the public can learn much 
about it-while his more complex 
aims in Lebanon and Nicaragua will 
necessarily unfold slowly enough for 
democratic curbs to become avail-
able. Unfortunately, a nuclear war 
would likely be long over before any 
surviving public opinion could exert 
control. This is perhaps the best 
reason for learning new foreign pol-
icy games to play. Cl 
Beyond Roles 
Lois Reiner 
Many of you know that Mother 
was not always easy to live with. 
None of us is, of course. But in the 
case of Emma Dau Bertram, I 
would say the problem had to do 
with the fact that she had learned 
too well what is society's Big Rule: 
you are what you do. You and the 
role you play in the world, in other 
words, are synonymous. 
But the role that she had per-
formed so dutifully, so loyally, so 
beautifully for almost 72 years had 
been taken from her. She came to 
us as widow-a role without clear 
guidelines. Not only was she no 
longer Dad's wife, she was herself 
by June of 1984 in need of what 
some might call "mothering." Con-
sequently, she felt guilty and was 
often bitter and more than a little 
confused. 
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She had not been able to con-
vince herself that, as God's precious 
child, she was much more than any 
role society assigns for the sake of 
Order. As long as she had been 
able to perform wifely and 
motherly tasks, she hadn't particu-
larly minded having that voice, 
which is inside all of us questioning 
the human limitations of such 
Order, effectively squelched. 
Taking care of her physical 
needs was no great challenge, not 
even in the end when we had be-
come her arms and legs. The al-
most overwhelming job, however, 
was convincing her that she was 
more-much more-than the roles 
she had outlived. But in taking that 
on, we learned more about what it 
means to be human, got more back 
in spiritual strength, than we had 
bargained for. 
We learned patience and humil-
ity and perspective, certainly. More 
than anything, however, we learned 
together the precious peace that 
comes with activating the unique 
non-role voices in each of us. To 
make a very long and tension-filled 
story short, let me say we ended up 
as good friends. Mothering and 
daughtering and son-in-Jawing had 
nothing to do with that. As Mom 
herself put it one November morn-
ing: "Everything's so different 
here. But-I think that's good!" 
She said other things signifying 
proof of breakthrough. One after-
noon we had just settled into the 
car for our daily ride into the 
country. Suddenly, as though she 
had been trying to formulate it for 
a long time, she said: "Sometimes I 
think I'm already in Paradise. You 
treat me like a queen!" The won-
der in her voice suggested that she 
was coming to understand that one 
can still be loved and honored, 
even without a specific role to play 
in the world's scheme of things. 
She was truly a delight when she 
discovered that what she felt and 
thought about everything from old 
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and new experiences to theological 
debates was worth sharing. "Now I 
can make sense out of that!" she 
exclaimed many times. How seldom 
before she had ever been asked 
what, or if, she felt and thought 
about anything reflects how little 
was ever expected of her outside of 
prescribed duties. 
Sometimes she would come back 
downstairs long after we thought 
she was asleep for the night, bear-
ing heavy baggage. Sometimes that 
baggage was in the form of old 
hurts, but we won't recount those. 
Eventually, she began unloading 
new confusions. 
One of these had to do with Pon-
tius Pilate, whom she had always 
considered a Good Man. At least 
he had not condemned Jesus 
Christ. But that particular day she 
had read that Pilate had probably 
ended up a suicide. Two hours of 
continuous praying had not les-
sened her despair of her own salva-
tion. 
Then we talked about how none 
of us is without sin; that God sent 
His Son to pay for those sins-for 
all time; that it's not what we do or 
don't do, but only that we believe 
that is our consolation. "Oh!" she 
cried then, pressing her hands to 
her lovely face, "tell me that again. 
Every night!" 
Two years of living with Mother 
was not always fun. But we were 
working hard together, until the 
breakthroughs added up and all 
her old demons seemed to have 
vanished. And we could fight and 
forgive, reminisce and venture for-
ward in ways that now make me 
want to weep with relief and 
gratitude. Role-less, almost totally 
dependent on us and others, she fi-
nally recognized that real living has 
no set rules-is not orderly, effi-
cient, predictable. 
I am convinced she died knowing 
she was loved simply because she 
was God's beloved child, not be-
cause of her well-performed roles 
somewhere along the line. "God 
will reward you" was one of the last 
phrases she uttered. Oh, how He 
has, Mother! Thank you for setting 
it up. 
Good as Gospel 
the pale sun 
• • •• 
filtered through the oddly shaped 
pieces of colored glass 
and stripped the pew 
in front of me 
I was glad for the diversion 
as the gospel was yet a long way 
off and the epistle 
was being sung by the choir 
who had been coached by 
Mrs. Tishauser in the proper 
way of chairing epistles 
the minister looked dubious 
and belched into his hymnbook 
the acolyte stood when he should 
have sat and the congregation 
ever on the alert 
for new dimensions in worship 
rose 
then the minister had to rise 
and the choir director thinking 
that some kind of heavenly cue 
cut the choir off short 
and I after all had my spectral 
sunbeam oozing its way across 
the lovely pleats 
of the girl in front 
in a perfect hush 
with everybody standing and 
waiting 
for the choir or the minister 
or the acolyte 
and I smiled at that thinking 
it good as gospel 
J. T. ledbetter 
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Law and Order? 
Dot Nuechterlein 
Ordinarily I consider myself to 
be a conscientious, law-abiding citi-
zen. But when push comes to 
shove, I have to admit that there 
are a couple of areas in which non-
conformity and larceny dwell in the 
heart. 
There is one set of laws I used to 
break regularly, having stopped 
only because the situation changed 
and temptation no longer exists; 
there's another set I have trans-
gressed nearly every day in living 
memory, and still do. 
The honest truth is, I am an in-
ternational smuggler and a speed 
limit scofflaw. And the really sinful 
part is that I have never been able 
to force myself to feel the least bit 
guilty about either crime. 
This all came to mind recently 
when on the same day I read two 
news items, one about international 
customs and the other about 
people who support the 55 m.p.h. 
law, even though they do not per-
sonally abide by it. 
When I lived across the border 
the duty-free limits for goods al-
lowed into that country were 
minuscule. Of course I understood 
the economic reasons for those lim-
its-inexpensive, high quality com-
modities flooding into the land 
could have devastated domestic 
manufacturing and trade-but I 
had grave difficulty applying that 
system of thought to my situation. 
Rationalization is a wonderful 
thing, you know. Back in the USA, 
where everything was cheaper and 
better made, I often stocked up on 
stuff like children's clothing, 
California wine, and grocery items 
that weren't available elsewhere. I 
had no intention of reselling any-
thing to anyone else; that was not 
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my country and I wasn't there by 
choice; and the taxation level 
seemed so repressive that my lim-
ited budget simply went much far-
ther down home. And we are not 
talking big bucks here: limited 
budget it was, indeed. So I guess 
somehow I felt myself to be exemp-
ted from the general rule. 
Lest you think that someone else 
might be incriminated by this dis-
cussion, let me hasten to add that 
the other driver of the family car 
never lied going through customs. 
When he said we had only the limit 
to declare, he thought that to be so. 
One of us did all of the shopping 
and packing, so only when I drove 
through the gates was there ever a 
smiling fib. 
Only once did I make the mis-
take of telling him that I wanted to 
take back a jug of wine (which was 
too many ounces to be legal), and 
he wouldn't permit it. He forcibly 
removed the bottle from the car 
and gave it to relatives; I didn't 
speak to him for the next 400 miles 
and several days beyond. Of course 
he was right, but I didn't care. And 
my only salvation in this whole 
business is that I have moved back 
home and no longer live with that 
kind of "opportunity." 
The speed limits are another 
matter. I am one who just does not 
believe the propaganda about stay-
ing alive at 55. 
Perhaps the highway death rate 
is down, as the experts claim; but 
maybe that's because the popula-
tion is growing older, and we know 
statistically that older drivers have 
fewer accidents per mile than kids 
do. It can't be because people are 
driving more slowly-in the past 
decade I have done a lot of driving 
all over this country, and there are 
very few places where the speed 
limits seem to be taken seriously. 
When I was a child, my home 
state of Indiana did not have an 
explicit legal limit. The law said 
something about driving at a safe 
and prudent speed, given existing 
road and weather conditions. The 
fellow who taught me to drive, 
whose last name I used to share, 
was known as "The Flying Parson," 
because he drove safely and pru-
dently according to current condi-
tions, but never dawdled. I learned 
to keep my wits about me and pay 
attention to my driving, but I also 
learned to move it. 
Of course highways were not ter-
rific in those days, and I can un-
derstand how we need some spe-
cific guidelines today, especially 
since the number of people on the 
roads must surely have increased 
plenty in recent decades. It didn't 
seem unreasonable to drive at 65 
when that was pretty much the uni-
form law. But given cars with more 
horsepower, plus the limited in-
terstate system, 55 seems ridicul-
ous. That must be why most driv-
ers apparently feel themselves to be 
exceptions, and race along their 
merry way. 
It's a good thing I wasn't around 
during prohibition, because I prob-
ably would have been a sinner then 
also. Oh, I don't drink a whole lot 
and could practice abstinence with-
out much trouble; I am also well 
aware that Demon rum can wreak 
havoc in many lives. But there is 
something about legal action in 
such matters that causes concern, 
especially when it leads to 
wholesale disregard for the law, 
and I tend to turn rebellious at the 
very idea. 
No doubt my philosopher friends 
will point out the errors of my 
moral reasoning, and no doubt 
they will be correct. But my flexible 
conscience refuses to give up the 
privilege of making up its own 
mind, so I expect that every so 
often I will find myself on the dark 
side of the law. But then, they al-
ways did tell us in criminology 
classes that the line between law-
keepers and law-breakers was 
•• pretty slim. •• 
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For Good Reading 
In a Glad New Year 
In Time-
For Christmas 
The herald angels' song is an ever-
lasting antiphony ... It moves down 
the centuries above, beneath, and in 
the earth from Christmas to Christ-
mas to Christmas . . . In it alone is 
hope before death and after death ... 
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christ-
mas, to the 3,000th, and at length to 
the last Christmas the world will see 
. . . And on that fmal Christmas, as 
on the first, the angels will know, as 
we must know now, that the heart 
which began to beat in Bethlehem still 
beats in the world and for the world 
... And for us ... 
0. P. Kretzmann 
The Pilgrim 
Many years will pass before you un-
derstand Christmas . . . In fact, you 
will never understand it completely 
... But you can always believe in it, 
always . . . The Child has come to 
keep us company ... To tell us that 
heaven is nearer than we had dared 
to think . . . To put the hope of 
eternity in our eyes ... To tell us 
that the manger is never empty for 
those who retum to it . . . And you 
will find with Him, I know, a hap-
piness which you will never find 
alone ... 
A Free Gift Book for New Subscribers 
0. P. Kretzmann 
Christmas Garlands 
Mail to: 
0. P. Kretzmann, President of Val-
paraiso University from 1940to 1968, 
was also Editor of The Cresset from 
1937 to 1968. In these two rare books 
many of his beloved "The Pilgrim" 
meditations were reprinted and are 
now available to new Cresset sub-
scribers as a gift to themselves-or 
to give as a thoughtful Christmas gift 
to friends. This offer expires December 
15, 1986. Current subscribers who 
wish to purchase either book may 
do so by sending $4.25 to cover 
shipping and the cost of the book. 
·~The Cresset 
Valparaiso University 
•• Valparaiso, Indiana 46383 
Yes, please send us one year (nine issues) of The Cresset and the gift 
book checked below. We enclose a check payable to The Cresset for 
$9.75 for each subscription and gift book ordered. ($8.50 for the sub-
scription and $1.25 for the shipping and handling of the gift book) 
------------ The Pilgrim ------------ Christmas Garlands 
NaJne ______________________________________________ _ 
StreeL_ ____________________________________________ __ 
City ____________________ State __________ ZIP ----------
